

Who believes misinformation that is aligned with dominant narratives in mainstream media?

Felix Schläpfer*

FS Economic Research, Kurlistrasse 40, 8404 Winterthur, Switzerland

*Correspondence: felixschlaepfer @ economicresearch.ch

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Abstract

Much research on misinformation has focused on misinformation in social media and on claims opposed to mainstream views. The present study examines misinformation that is aligned with dominant narratives in mainstream media. Misinformation is identified based on an epistemically rooted definition. To account for the complexity of misinformation the acceptance of misinformation was measured as full agreement with false or misleading claims. The empirical study focused on 20 false or misleading claims about important international issues which were evaluated by a sample of $n=1590$ survey respondents in German-speaking Switzerland. Across all 20 claims, the population-weighted proportion of „fully agree“ responses ranged from 0.06 to 0.50. Acceptance of misinformation was significantly ($p<0.05$) associated with male gender (+0.04), medium or higher education (–0.06 and –0.05), more than 30 minutes of news consumption per day (relative to less) (+0.06), Green (0.09) and Liberal (+0.07) party identification (compared with the Center party), medium (compared with high) trust in government (–0.04), and a non-mainstream primary news source (–0.28; relative to public TV). The pattern of results is similar for a subset of the claims that had been fully or partly corrected by public authorities. Several associations are opposite to those found for non-mainstream misinformation suggesting an important role of the type of misinformation examined. The level of acceptance of misinformation and the associations with news behavior indicate mainstream news media are an important source of misinformation. The findings contrast with mainstream media consumers’ perceptions and expectations of the news media. Together with recent work showing that Swiss news media heavily rely on few largely US-aligned sources, these findings raise concerns that the misinformation in Swiss mainstream media may also be systematically biased. Regulatory measures to improve source transparency may be needed to prevent biased news media from further compromising the ‘free formation of political will and unbiased voting’ stipulated in the Swiss constitution.

Keywords: Beliefs, disinformation, mainstream, misinformation, news media, survey, Switzerland

Introduction

Research on misinformation has rapidly increased over the past decades. However, most studies have focused on misinformation in social media. Misinformation in legacy media has been considered mainly in connection with populist governments or authoritative governments of non-Western countries (Broda & Strömbäck 2024), or in cases where traditional media unintentionally amplified misinformation (Tsfati et al. 2020). The possibility that liberal Western governments and mainstream media may themselves be an important source of misinformation has received little attention (Altay et al. 2023). Researchers have therefore called for more work on misinformation and its prevalence in varying media types and outlets (Altay et al. 2023, Broda and Strömbäck 2024).

The conceptual approaches have also been limited. First, truth standards that rely on mainstream opinion may be sufficient for some purposes, but they neglect the possibility of institutional bias (Chaufan et al. 2024). A broader study of misinformation including false or misleading claims that are aligned with dominant narratives in mainstream media requires more epistemically principled approaches. Second, misinformation beliefs or acceptance have often been measured in ways that do not account for the complexity of misinformation (Soprano et al. 2021). Claims that omit important information can be a much more effective way to mislead than blatantly false claims. Definitions of misinformation and measurement that rely on a dichotomous distinction of veracity may not be useful for the study of politically relevant misinformation.

The objective of this paper is to examine the acceptance of false or misleading claims that are aligned with dominant narratives in mainstream media using a conceptual and empirical approach that accounts for the mentioned measurement issues. The empirical procedure was to identify international news stories in mainstream media that are false or misleading and summarize their main claims in short statements. A panel survey was then conducted to measure the agreement with the false or misleading claims, with only „fully agree“ responses interpreted as acceptance of misinformation. The survey was conducted among the German speaking population of Switzerland.

The study makes three main contributions. First, the results demonstrate that misinformation that is aligned with dominant narratives on important international issues is fully accepted by substantial parts of the population. Second, the individual-level correlates of misinformation acceptance differ substantially from those found for work on non-mainstream misinformation; this suggests that examined types of misinformation may play a decisive role

and may partly explain the the patters found in studies on misinformation in social and other non-legacy media. Third, the results show that the Swiss media fail to deliver on news consumers expectations on truthful reporting, raising concerns that misinformation in mainstream news media may undermine unbiased opinion formation on international issues.

The following section provides literature background and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methods: the conception and measurement of misinformation, selection of statements, survey questionnaire and implementation, and statistical analysis. The remaining sections contain the Results, Discussion and Conclusions.

2 Background and hypotheses

2.1 Identification and consumer acceptance of mainstream misinformation

Research on misinformation has increased rapidly in several fields including psychology (Ecker et al. 2022), political science (Jerit & Zhao 2020) and communication (Broda & Strömbäck 2024). Reserachers have focused on political and health beliefs, on prevalence, detection, and correction of misinformation, and on the determinants of misinformation detection. Regarding different sources, most work has focused on social media, and other online sources (Broda & Strömbäck 2024). While special attention to these sources is certainly justified, misinformation aligned with dominant mainstream views has been largely neglected. Issues with misinformation is often entirely associated with obscure conspiracy beliefs, „state-sponsered disinformation“ in Russia or China or „populist discourse“ in Western countries where Western elites sometimes „bypass mainstream media and its journalistic scrutiny“ (Broda & Strömbäck 2024) or where „traditional news media are increasingly scapegoated for misleading the people“ (Hameleers et al. 2022).

Combined with the focus on misinformation in non-legacy media, researchers have often relied on pragmatic assumptions that information from official authorities and institutions in power is correct (Altay et al. 2023). Unfortunately, even professional fact-checks (Pennycook & Rand 2019) or the scientific consensus (Lewandowsky 2013) cannot be blindly trusted. Where powerful economic interests or powerful governments are involved, state sources and scientific institutions can be compromised. One famous instance is the US government’s manufactured evidence about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (Lewandowsky et al. 2005). Unfortunately, much research on misinformation made little effort to examine whether additional epistemological diligence may be warranted (Heyward

2025). As a consequence, the literature may now be contaminated with „misinformation about misinformation“ (Altay et al. 2023). Problematic practices are increasingly recognized (e.g. Chaufan et al. 2024).

A reasonably independent „truth standard“ is particularly important in the study of contested political or geopolitical issues where mainstream media may be aligned with interested parties that could benefit from misinformation about major events including of wars or the Covid-19 pandemic. Importantly, the problem goes beyond intentional misinformation. Where political issues are concerned, identities, values and motivation may influence perceptions and reasoning (Kunda 1990). Western government and mainstream media representatives are naturally influenced by Western education, culture, and values which may affect their beliefs in a variety of ways (Herman & Chomsky 1988). Their evaluation of political issues, historical events, and scientific consensus should be interpreted with caution, even under assumptions that these actors are fully honest.

One strategy to establish an uncontentious truth standard that is independent of mainstream opinion is to focus on misinformation that is easily verifiable, as in a recent study of knowledge about Ukraine war (Beattie & Sherstoboeva 2025). Unfortunately this choice may be heavily restrict the domain of misinformation – to the point where the most relevant kinds of misinformation are excluded. An alternative strategy is to rely on topic experts with a record of independence and impartiality. Regarding the natural or laboratory origin of Covid-19, for instance, the decision could be to discount the opinions of experts who are highly involved in the issue (Ackerman et al. 2024) and rely on independent experts instead (e.g. Harrison & Sachs 2022).

Regarding the empirical measurement of misinformation beliefs or acceptance, many studies have used direct belief rating with true/false options (e.g. Lewandowky et al. 2005, Rathje et al. 2023). However, when statements are not simply false but cherrypicked, imprecise, incomplete etc., simple true/false questions may not account for the complexity of misinformation (Soprano et al. 2021). Many studies have therefore used Likert or agreement-style question formats (e.g. Pennycook et al. 2021). While the simple true/false questions may miss important aspects of the respondents' understanding of information, the agreement scales provide them the opportunity to express perceived issues such as incompleteness of the claim (Rodrigo-Ginés et al. 2024).

Regarding the prevalence of misinformation and its acceptance, there are several studies that examined this, but the results naturally depend decisively on the issues. For instance, a semi-automated content analysis matching 77 fact-checked claims to subtitles from

1,382 episodes of German public broadcast news and talk shows found misinformation in 4.85 % of the examined episodes, mainly from populist politicians (Nenno 2025). However, most existing studies have focused on single topics. An exception is Flynn (2016) who measured how many of his respondents held misperceptions and how confident there were about these misperceptions. Across 11 facts about taxes, debt and deficit, welfare, gun control, unemployment, environment and foreign aid, an average of 20 percent held confident misperceptions. Regarding the perspective of news consumers, an annual Reuters survey across 47 countries (Newman et al. 2025) found that 32 percent of the respondents viewed journalists as major contributors to misinformation. This percentage was even higher in polarized markets like the US and Greece where right-leaning audiences accused mainstream media of deliberate bias.

Exposure to misinformation can shape a persons' attitudes even if they recognize the information is false (Thorson 2015). Research has therefore examined if false news that has been corrected or retracted is discounted by the recipients of the information. In a classic study on misinformation about the Iraq war, the authors find that participants in the United States where most of the population supported the war did not show sensitivity to correction, whereas participants in Australia and Germany did (Lewandowsky et al. 2005). A meta-analysis study on the continued influence of misinformation found that corrective messages do not entirely eliminate the effect of misinformation. Corrected messages were less effective if the misinformation was attributed to a credible source, had been repeated multiple times prior to correction, or when there was a time lag between the delivery and the correction of misinformation (Walter & Tukachinsky 2019).

The first research question is (RQ1): Based on examples of misinformation that are aligned with dominant perspectives in Western mainstream media, (a) how frequent is the acceptance of misinformation?; and (b) how frequent is the acceptance of misinformation that has been corrected by public authorities?

2.2 Factors associated with misinformation acceptance

The individual-level factors associated with beliefs in misinformation have been an important topic in research. Studies have examined socioeconomic characteristics, variables measuring media consumption behavior, and prior beliefs and identity. Among these correlates of misinformation, the last mentioned have turned out to be the most important. Due to the large

amount of recent work, the following brief review is limited to findings reported in recent reviews.

Starting with socioeconomic correlates of misinformation, a recent meta-analysis of 31 US studies on true *vs.* false online headlines found that older participants were better able to distinguish true and false information, while no significant effect was found for either gender or education (Sultan et al. 2024). A review of 61 studies on health misinformation found belief in misinformation to be associated with lower subject knowledge, lower literacy/numeracy, older age, lower education, and racial minority status (Nan et al. 2022). Regarding media behavior, higher mainstream news consumption has been found to be associated with lower acceptance of misinformation (Jamieson & Albarracín 2020), although mainstream media may sometimes help spread misinformation (Tsfati et al. 2020).

A primary finding of research in psychology and political science has been that people are more likely to accept misinformation that fits their prior beliefs or identity, i.e. when it aligns with their attitudes and when it supports their group or ideology. Partisanship bias has been found to be more important than analytical thinking, and even highly educated individuals have been found to believe misinformation when it aligned with their identity or ideology (Roozenbeek et al. 2023). Misinformation that challenges liberal views – which is the type of misinformation examined in most studies – should therefore be more easy to identify for liberals than for conservatives. Recent meta-analyses indeed find that misinformation acceptance is higher among those with a conservative ideology (Nan et al. 2022) or in the US context among Republicans and among those who distrust experts and authorities (Sultan et al. 2024).

Regarding mechanisms, a frequent psychological explanation for partisanship bias is motivated reasoning: individuals think analytically but interpret information based on motivations (Flynn et al. 2017, Kunda 1990). Other authors find that susceptibility to partisan misinformation is mainly associated with low attention and superficial headline focus (Simko et al. 2024) or heuristic processing (Pennycook & Rand 2019), while deliberation reduces belief in false headlines (Pennycook & Rand 2020) and sharing of low-credibility news in social media (Pennycook et al. 2021). Related to these effects of processing style are effects of repeated exposure or familiarity with the claim (Sultan et al. 2024). Furthermore, emotional content has been found to boost acceptance via reduced reasoning and superficial emotional processing (Martel et al. 2020).

Given that most research has focused on social media and on information critical of mainstream views, it is interesting to examine whether the factors associated with the

acceptance of misinformation that is aligned with dominant views in governments and mainstream media are similar. An obvious hypothesis is that the basic predictors like ideology, media behavior, and trust in authorities are the same, but that the direction of the relationship will be opposite. Following this hypothesis, acceptance of the misinformation would be associated with trust in authorities, liberal ideology, and the consumption of mainstream news. Conservatives, consumers of alternative media, and those mistrust government would be less likely to accept the misinformation.

The second research question is (RQ2): How is acceptance of mainstream misinformation associated with socioeconomic characteristics, media consumption behavior and political identification?

2.3 News consumers' expectations of news media

Any observation of misinformation and acceptance thereof by consumers of mainstream media would raise the question how misinformation and acceptance of misinformation relate to consumers' perceptions and expectations of the news media. Do the news consumers trust the media, and how much do they care about truthful reporting and impartially? Related to expectations of truthful and impartial reporting, there is additional question. Western news media including those in Switzerland take most of their international news from only a small number of international news agencies and other sources (Vogler et al. 2024) which are often aligned with US economic and strategic interests (Ewaida 2025, Nishide 2025). In the case of news about armed conflicts, the material comes often from government and military sources and often from only one side of the conflict (Udris et al. 2023). On this basis, the international news published in the Swiss mainstream media must be expected to be systematically biased towards narratives that promote economic and strategic interests of the United States rather than European or Swiss narratives. The same systematic bias must be expected for any misinformation found in Swiss mainstream media. It has long been hypothesized that US actors can use their influence on Western news media to promote favorable opinions of US foreign and economic policy in other countries. The aim of US governments and interest group actors may not be to ensure a diversity of perspectives but to promote public support (or at least acceptance of) the preferred policies while maintaining perceptions of a free press (Herman & Chomsky 1988). This raises the question whether Swiss news consumers also have specific expectations that the media to support their own government or the interests of their country.

The third research question is therefore: RQ3: What do the news consumers expect of the Swiss news media, and how is the acceptance of misinformation associated with these expectations?

3 Methods

3.1 Definition of misinformation

Existing research on misinformation recognizes „partisan media“ as an important source of misinformation on policy issues at the national-level (Altay et al. 2023). Scaling up to the global level and the international policy issues examined in this present study, the Western mainstream media can be similarly understood as partisan media. Hence, pragmatic but shallow standard definitions of misinformation, which essentially equate truth with (Western) consensus or authority are not useful for the analysis of misinformation on international issues. The purpose of the present study requires an epistemologically deeper approach (Altay et al. 2023, Hayward 2023, Hayward 2025).

The following definition should serve the present purpose: *Misinformation is content that lacks proper justification but is presented as having a degree of evidential support it does not actually possess, where „evidential support“ is defined independently of institutional authority and instead grounded in transparency, reproducibility, and methodological soundness accessible to competent reviewers.* This definition focuses on justification, accounts for evolving knowledge, recognizes the role of interpretation, distinguishes interpretive errors from factual ones, and avoids the conflation of authority and truth. Importantly, the definition includes cases in which information is not fully false but misleading, for instance due to omission of relevant information. The definition therefore accounts for the finding that incomplete information can be as misleading as, or even more misleading than, fully false information (Altay et al. 2023, Rodrigo-Ginés et al. 2024).

3.2 Measure of misinformation acceptance

The measurement of acceptance of claims must account for the non-binary nature of misinformation. In the present study, acceptance of misinformation was measured based on the agreement with specified claims on a scale from „fully agree“ to „do not agree at all“

and offering an explicit “do not know” option. The resulting variable thus measures the strength of acceptance. The strength of claim acceptance must be clearly distinguished from strength of misinformation acceptance. In the case of a partly true claim, for instance, a partial acceptance of the claim is not a partial acceptance of the misinformation but a valid response to a partially true claim. For a simple example, assume that the degree of veracity can be quantitatively measured, and an examined claim is 50 % true. A „partly agree“ response should then not be interpreted as a „partial acceptance of misinformation“; instead, the „partly agree“ response is fully consistent with a full acceptance of the true 50 % of the claim and the full rejection of the false 50% of the claim. In practice, of course, the degree of veracity of a claim cannot be quantitatively measured. The example only serves to explain the interpretation of partial agreement with partial misinformation.

Based on this rationale, acceptance of misinformation is therefore measured as a binary variable that is coded 1 when the response to a false or misleading claim is „fully agree“ and 0 otherwise. The indicator variable identifies full agreement with a statement that is misinformation because the statement is false or misleading. The variable unambiguously identifies cases where respondents state a belief in misinformation or accept misinformation. Contrary to the „fully agree“ responses, the „rather agree“ responses cannot be identified as acceptance of misinformation, as we do not have a basis to judge whether the partial agreement entails acceptance of any false or misleading parts or aspects of the claim. In some cases it may, as in the case of fully false claims, and in some cases it may not. The binary measurement and coding obviates the need for quantifying the degree of veracity of the claims and thus allows a clean identification of acceptance of misinformation in false or biased claims.

3.3 Identification of mainstream misinformation and selection of false or misleading claims

Online search tools including duckduckgo.com, chatgpt.com, and grok.com were used to identify examples of misinformation in mainstream news stories about internationally relevant political issues. The search distinguished two domains of issues, the war in Ukraine and „other topics“. Furthermore the search included both examples of misinformation that had later been partly or full corrected by authorities of the party that had an interest in or benefitted from the misinformation, and examples for which this was not the case. In line with the definition, misinformation was identified based on the authors evaluation of the available

empirical evidence based on the analysis of (Western) academic researchers and journalists with a proven track record of independent judgement.

To illustrate the process, the claim that „Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an unprovoked war of aggression“ is identified as false or misleading (and hence labelled misinformation), as the statement, even though fully supported by some Western governments and mainstream media, neglects substantial contrary evidence. Moreover, the statement omits relevant information that many respectable Western academics and political figures do not agree. A second example is „The origin of the COVID-19 pandemic (coronavirus) is probably a transmission of the virus from an animal to a human.“ According to mainstream sources, the claim is correct. The freely available version of the language model ChatGPT, for instance, estimated the probability of a laboratory origin at 21 percent (in November 2025). The number is based on a survey of 168 virologists and epidemiologists (Ackerman et al. 2024). However, the claim omits important information that there exists substantive contrary evidence including opposite conclusions by respectable scientists and by US and German national security services. In addition, the claim fails to mention the important circumstantial information that authorities of responsible parties have obstructed transparency. As these examples also show, the identification as misinformation does not require that the claims are „completely wrong“ or even „mostly wrong“ – however defined. The assumption is only that the claim lacks proper justification but is presented as having a degree of evidential support it does not actually have (cf. Section 3.1).

From a larger number of identified examples of misinformation, twenty high-profile examples were selected. Half of the chosen stories had been partly or fully corrected by authorities, and the other half of the stories had not. Furthermore, within each of these sets of examples, five were concerned with the war in Ukraine and the other five with other issues. From each of these examples of misinformation, a short one-sentence statement was derived which summarized the key claim. This selection of twenty statements was given to two colleagues and slightly modified on the basis of their comments. Based on the abovementioned definition of misinformation which focuses on transparency and process, the misinformation was roughly characterized with categories like „missing, weak or inconclusive evidence“.

The final statements, their classification as either corrected or not corrected, and the additional characterization are shown in the Appendix (Table A1).

3.4 Survey

Survey questionnaire

The survey was conducted in collaboration with the opinion research institute gfs.bern. The questionnaire included the following parts: (1) a welcome message; (2) questions about gender and age (used for quota-based sampling); (3) introduction; (4) questions about the extent of agreement with 20 statements; (5) Questions about interest in politics and political values; (6) questions about media use, primary news sources, and perceptions and expectations of the media; and (7) questions about the respondent (trust in government, left-right self-assessment, party identification, voting rights, and place of residence). For easier response to (4), the questions were presented in three blocks (on the war in Ukraine, on other recent topics and on events further back in time, including three on Ukraine). Within the three blocks, the questions were placed in random order. The second block also contained a question to test the attention of the respondents.

The introduction to the main questions (3) was presented in two versions to check how strongly the responses depended on the details of the wording, Version A introduced the main questions about beliefs with the sentence: *„As part of a research project, we are interested in your perception of current issues and events.“* Version B instead asked: *„As part of a research project, we are interested in your perception of widely held views on current issues and events.“* In each of the six quota-based groups based on age and gender, half of the participants received questionnaire version A and the other half received version B.

The questions about agreement with the statements, amount of time spent with the news sources, primary and second news sources, and expectations of the media were originally prepared for this survey. The menu of major media organisations offered in the questions about primary and secondary news sources was taken from the Swiss yearbook on media quality (RPS 2024, p. 113). (One large news organization, Ringier, is missing due to a mistake in the preparation and review of the questionnaire. These respective responses are therefore subsumed in the category ‘Others’.) The remaining questions are standard questions of the survey institute gfs.bern which implemented the survey. The complete questionnaire text is available in the Supplementary materials S3.

Survey panel and implementation

The survey was conducted as an online panel survey. The following description is based on the technical report by gfs.bern (gfs.bern 2025). The survey was conducted with gfs.bern's in-house panel „Polittrends“ which consists of around 41,000 subjects aged between 16 and 100 years from all over Switzerland. The panel had been recruited by telephone as well as in the context of ongoing survey work using various channels. In addition, interested persons can register on the panel's website (opt in). The email addresses of those registered are verified. In contrast to almost all other panels in Switzerland, the participants of the panel are more interested in socio-political and less interested in consumer issues. The participants in surveys are rewarded through a scoring system. Per minute of questioning a score of 20 points is assigned, which are then compensated with 0.2 francs each. In the present survey with a duration of about 10 minutes, the participants therefore received 2 Swiss francs.

The survey population was defined as (German speaking) individuals over 18 years in German speaking Switzerland. Data collection was carried out using the online survey system (NEBU) of the gfs survey service. Invitations, reminders and incentives were also handled by this service. From June 19 to June 23, a pretest was conducted, which yielded a sample of 118 completed questionnaires. Based on the pretest, one section in the questionnaire was slightly adjusted; after the question about the primary news source, an additional question was included about the second most frequently used news source. The main survey was conducted between June 25 and July 2, 2025. It was stopped on July 2 as it became clear that the quota of 18-39-year-old women would not be achievable for the original target of $n=2000$ respondents. Based on the obtained 261 valid questionnaires from women aged 18-39, and the quota for in the other groups were adjusted, yielding a total sample of $n=1590$ valid questionnaires. The surplus responses – i.e., valid questionnaires that arrived after the group-specific quota had been met – were excluded from the analysis.

3.5 Statistical analysis

A weighting variable for the 1590 observations was estimated by gfs.bern. The weighting variable corrects for distortions in survey participation and approximates the correct ratio of individuals according to the actual distribution in the population aged 18 and over in German-speaking Switzerland. For this weighting variable, age and gender were initially weighted interlocked. Afterwards, the distribution of settlement type (urban, intermediate, rural) was

weighted according to language (German-speaking Switzerland only), education (11 levels), and party (SVP, FDP, Die Mitte, GLP, SP, Grüne, other parties). The sources for the weighting bases are the population and household statistics STATPOP of the Federal Statistical Office (age, gender, language, and type of settlement). The type of settlement is based on a municipality typology from the Federal Statistical Office (FSO 2024, p. 21). Party affiliation was weighted according to the results of the 2023 National Council elections, and education is based on gfs.bern's own calculations using the 2018 census from the Federal Statistical Office.

The weighting was performed iteratively using a raking ratio algorithm. In the order specified above, one dimension was weighted (for example, the distribution of age by language and gender by language interlocked) so that the weighted distribution exactly matched the real distribution. When weighting the second dimension, the previous weight was taken and adjusted so that the weighted distribution of the second dimension exactly matched the real distribution. This was continued for all further dimensions. Since each weighting of the next dimension distorts the weight of the previous dimension again, this process was repeated iteratively until all weighted distributions were close enough to the actual distribution (± 0.5 percentage points). Further details on the methodology are available in gfs.bern (2025).

The statistical analyses included descriptive statistics of the unweighted and weighted responses on the 20 statements with a focus on „fully agree“ responses. The effect of the experimental treatment and the association of responses with individual variables were examined in logistic regressions. In the analysis of beliefs about individual statements, the dependent variable is binary (coded 1 for „fully agree“ and 0 otherwise). In analysis for sets of (20 or 10) statements, the dependent variable is a proportion (number of responses „fully agree“ divided by number of statements). All explanatory variables were specified as indicator variables. In some cases, multiple levels in the original data were lumped for simplicity (cf. survey questionnaire in Supplement S3). Party identification and news sources were included with the indicator variable „Other“ when there were less than 15 observations in the category. Indicator variables „Do not know/no response“ were included when there were 15 or more such responses to a question.

4 Results

4.1 Sample description

Table 1 describes the sample in terms of variable means and standard deviation in the unweighted sample, and variable mean of the population-weighted sample.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Description	N	Mean	SD	WM
Treatment	Wording	1590	0.50	0.50	0.47
Age (q)	Age in years	1590	50.8	17.3	51.15
Gender (q)	1: male; 0: female	1590	0.50	0.500	0.50
Household income	Monthly net income (CHF 0: 0-499; 1000: 500-1499; ... 24'000: 23'500-24'499; 25'000: 24'500+)	1405	9'448	5'076	8'200
Househ. size	Number of adults	1561	1.95	0.97	1.90
Education (w)	1 (low): less than mandatory; mandatory; transitional education; general education without bacalaureate; other; NR/DNK 2 (medium): vocational training; 3 (high): bacalaureate or teacher seminar; post-secondary training; higher vocational training; university; doctoral or higher	1590	2.69	0.58	2.31
Residence (w)	1: urban; 2: intermediary; 3: rural	1549	1.41	0.68	1.49
Interest in politics	1: very interested; 2: rather i.; 3: rather not i.; 4: not at all i.	1582	1.56	0.63	1.66
Left-right orientation	0: fully left; ...; 5: center; ...; 10: fully right	1570	4.40	2.50	5.30
News frequency	1: several times per day; 2: daily; 3: several times per week; 4: once a week; 5: less than once a week; 6: never	1589	1.82	0.92	1.94
News time	Minutes per day (computed from hours and minutes; values > 6000 set to 'missing')	1555	91.4	81.7	96.7
Trust government	1: can rely, does best it can for all; 2: draw; 3: cannot rely, unresponsive to people	1577	1.76	0.84	1.95
Trust media	<i>"I trust the traditional media."</i> ^a	1585	3.67	1.07	3.41
Expect committed to truth	<i>"The media should be committed above all to the truth."</i> ^a	1587	4.90	0.35	4.90
Expect report impartially	<i>"In crises and conflicts the media should report impartially."</i> ^a	1587	4.78	0.51	4.78
Expect support government	<i>"In crises the media should support the government."</i> ^a	1556	2.81	1.19	2.88
Expect support interest of country	<i>"In international conflicts the media should represent the interests of their country."</i> ^a	1550	2.65	1.21	2.97
Value independence	<i>"International cooperation and global exchange"</i> vs. <i>"National independence"</i> ^b	1581	2.44	1.53	3.02
Value less immigration	<i>"Promote immigration"</i> vs. <i>"Make immigration more difficult"</i> ^c	1585	3.56	1.63	4.10

Notes: q: variable used for quota-based sampling; w: variable used for weighting; SD: standard deviation; WM: weighted mean. ^a Scale: 1: do not agree at all; 2: rather don't agree; 3: part-part; 4: rather agree; 5: fully agree; ^b Scale: 1 = „A country that focuses on international cooperation and global exchange“; ... ; 6 = „A country that primarily builds on national independence“; ^c Scale: 1 = „A country that promotes immigration“; (...) ; 6 = a country that makes immigration more difficult.

The descriptive statistics include two variables that were not used in the further empirical analysis – *Interest in politics* and *Left-right orientation* –, as these are informative for judgments about representativeness. The income variable is based on *Household income* and *Household size* which were used to calculate income per adult in the household. Additional descriptive statistics including proportions of the weighted responses for each level of each variable are available in Schläpfer (2025).

4.2 Acceptance of the statements

Population-weighted acceptance

Fig. 1 provides an overview of the weighted responses to the questions about the 20 statements. Notable results include the high proportion of unreserved agreement („fully agree“) with two statements regarding the war in Ukraine (statements U1 and U2) and the statement about the Chinese social credit score system (V3). The former two (or similar statements) have been central claims made by authorities in the United States (mainly U1) and Europe (see sources in Supplement S1). They have been repeated and rarely questioned in Western mainstream media including those in Switzerland since the beginning of the war. Claims similar to V3 have frequently been made in the Western media (including Swiss media) since Chinese authorities experimented with social credit scores at the local level in the 2010's.

Visual inspection shows that significant unreserved agreement is also found for statement that have been corrected by government authorities of the interested parties – marked with an asterisk (*) in Fig. 1. A prominent example is U1 which has been implicitly corrected by the General Secretary of the NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, and more directly by U. S. president Donald Trump and his envoy Steve Witkoff, among other sources (see Supplement 1). Acceptance of the claim on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (V8) shows that misinformation can stick for a long time, even when officials and the media have fully clarified the mistake. However, the numbers also show that not everybody buys the mainstream misinformation. For some statements that represent the standard view in Swiss mainstream media, such as V1, the unreserved agreement is only around 20 percent.




Figure 1. Agreement with statements about the war in Ukraine (top) and other issues (bottom). Asterisks (*) indicate statements that have been partly or fully corrected by public authorities of interested parties. (See Appendix for full statements.)

Unreserved acceptance by corrected/uncorrected status

Table 2 shows the mean percentage of respondents who „fully agreed“ for statements that *have* and statements that *have not* been corrected by authorities of the interested party. The numbers show that the media bias is reflected in the beliefs of substantial parts of the population for both statements that have been officially corrected and statements that have not.

Table 2. Percentage acceptance of statements (“fully agree”).

Category	N	“Fully agree” (% of all responses)		“Fully agree” (% excl. DNK/NR)	
		Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted
All statements	20	21.7	19.5	28.3	25.7
Uncorrected statements ^a	10	23.3	21.6	30.9	28.5
Corrected statements ^a	10	20.0	17.5	25.7	23.0

Notes: DNK/NR/: “Don’t know” and no response; ^a Statement has (has not) been partly or fully corrected by authorities of the interested party (see classification in Table A1 of the Appendix).

Range of unreserved acceptance rates of individual statements

There is a wide range of the acceptance rates across the individual misinformation statements (see Fig. 1 and Appendix Table 2). The percentage of the population-weighted sample that fully endorsed the statements ranged from 5.8 % (U10) to 49.8 % (U2). The percentage of „Don’t know“ or non-response ranged from 1.2 % (U2) to 62.8 % (U10). These two response variables are highly correlated (Pearson $r=0.658$; $p=0.0016$). The variation may reflect the varying prominence of the topics in the news media. While some statements on the war in Ukraine (like U1 and U2), featured prominently in daily news for years, others including the claims about a „ghost of Kyew“ (U10) or potential connections of Jeffrey Epstein with the Israeli secret service (V7) obtained only little coverage in mainstream media. As the selected statements are not in any ways representative of any wider universe of possible statements (however defined), the following analysis concentrates on the determinants rather than the prevalence of acceptance.

4.3 Association of beliefs with individual characteristics

Table 3 describes the variables used in the following regression analysis. The categories of the variables were entered as a sets of indicator variables. The last column shows the relative frequency of each level of the examined variables.

Table 3. Regression models: examined variables and levels.

Variable	Description	Categories and reference ^a	Relative frequency
Wording (n=1590)	Wording of question about statements (see Section 3.3)	A	0.50
		B (reference)	0.50
Age group (n=1590)	Age in years	18-39 (reference)	0.34
		40-64	0.42
		65+	0.24
Gender (n=1590)	Gender	Male (reference)	0.50
		female	0.50
Education (n=1590)	Highest completed education (categories, see Table 1)	Low (reference)	0.06
		medium	0.19
		high	0.75
Income group (n=1590)	Net income before taxes per adult individual in the household in CHF per month	<5000 (reference)	0.41
		5000-9999	0.38
		10'000-15'000	0.06
		>15'000	0.02
		DNK/NR	0.13
Residence (n=1549)	Urban/rural residence	Rural (reference)	0.11
		urban	0.68
		suburban	0.19
		DNK/NR	0.03
News time (n=1555)	Time spent with news media (minutes per day)	<30 (reference)	0.09
		30-59	0.15
		60-119	0.43
		120+	0.32
		DNK/NR	0.22
Trust in government (n=1577)	Perception of government (see text)	High (reference)	0.50
		medium	0.27
		low	0.23
Party (n=1568)	Party identification	People's Party	0.11
		Social Democrats	0.27
		Liberals	0.13
		Center (reference)	0.11
		Greens	0.10
		Evangelicals	0.01
		Green Liberals	0.13
		Alternative Left	0.01
		Other („clearly other“)	0.02
		No party	0.06
		Several („...equally“)	0.05
		DNK/NR	0.01
Primary news source (n=1578)	Most important news source (organisation)	SRG SSR (reference)	0.67
		TX Group	0.08
		CH Media	0.05
		NZZ-Gruppe	0.09
		Weltwoche	0.02
		Republik	0.01
		Other	0.08
Second news source (1590)	Second most important news source (organisation)	SRG SSR (reference)	0.15
		TX Group	0.20
		CH Media	0.20
		NZZ-Gruppe	0.11
		Nau	0.01
		Somedia	0.01
		Weltwoche	0.02
		Republik	0.05
		Wochenzeitung	0.02
		Other	0.19
		DNK/NR	0.01

Notes: ^a DNK/NR: Don't know/no response; coded as separate level when there were at last 15 such responses.

Table 4 shows the logit regression models for the summed responses to all 20 statements (Model 1), for the 10 corrected and 10 uncorrected statements (Models 2 and 3), and for two selected single statements (Models 4 and 5). (The signs of significant coefficients estimates for each of the 20 models of single statements are available in the Appendix 2, the estimates in the Supplement S2.) The analysis begins with the political variables, since previous research shows that acceptance of misinformation is most consistently associated prior beliefs.

Party identification across all 20 statements shows a fairly consistent pattern. Those who identify with left-wing and liberal parties were more likely to accept the misinformation than the Center party which was the reference group. The same pattern can be observed for the corrected statements only. Looking at these statements, those who favor the right-wing People's Party were about ten percentage points less likely to accept the statements than those of the Center Party (-0.104). The same liberal/conservative pattern is also found for the single statements, and the effect is even stronger (with differences in the probability of acceptance up to about 0.4 between left-wing and right-wing parties in the acceptance of the statement on Ukraine (U1). An additional notable result is that those who chose "No party" were less likely to accept the misinformation than the Center Party reference group (all statements and uncorrected statements).

Regarding *Trust in government*, the ratio of accepted statements was lower among those with a medium trust level (-0.041) than among those with high trust, while those with low trust were not significantly different from the other categories. The same pattern is also observed for the single statement on the origin of Covid-19 (V1). In the model for the corrected statements only, those with medium and low trust in government were each less likely to accept the misinformation than those with high trust. The same is found for the single statement about the war in Ukraine being unprovoked (U1).

Turning to news consumption behavior (*News time*), the respondents who spent 30 minutes per day or more with news were more likely to "fully agree" with the statements. Across the 20 statements, the probability was increased by about 0.06 (estimates between $+0.053$ to $+0.072$; Table 4, Model 1. Coding those who spend 30 minutes or more with a single indicator variable, the estimate is $+0.059$ ($p < 0.05$). The significant association with news consumption is observed for both corrected statements (Model 2) and uncorrected statements (Model 3). With statement U1, those who spent more than 30 minutes with news were also more likely to fully accept the statement ($+0.147$ to $+0.202$).

Regarding *Primary news source*, across all 20 statements, the beliefs of the audience of the major private sources (TX Group, CH Media and NZZ Group) did not differ significantly from the audience of public-law TV which was the reference category. However, those who reported the non-mainstream weekly *Weltwoche* as their primary news source were much more skeptical about the biased statements (-0.282) than those who mainly consume the news of the public-law TV. The results of the models for corrected and uncorrected statements are similar, although the audience of the (conservative) NZZ Group was more skeptical about the uncorrected statements (Model 3) and about the statement about the origin of Covid-19 (Model 5) than the reference group.

While the primary news source of a full 67 % of the respondents was public-law TV (see Table 3), the *Secondary news sources* were more diverse. The audiences of the other large news outlets were again similar to the public-law TV, except for the NZZ Group's audience which was more skeptical about the statements that had been corrected and about the statement about the natural origin of Covid-19.

Regarding socioeconomic characteristics, across all 20 statements, those with higher *Age* (65+) were more likely to accept the statements than those in the medium and lower age groups. The same is found for the single statements presented in Models 4 and 5. For the uncorrected statements only, the estimates show a linear increase of acceptance with age relative to those with less than 40 years (40–64: $+0.040$; 65+: $+0.084$). Regarding *Gender*, women were consistently more skeptical about the statements than men ($+0.044$). Those with medium or higher *Education* were more skeptical about the statements than those low education. *Income* and urban vs. rural *Residence* was not consistently associated with acceptance.

Finally, the question wording treatment (versions A and B) did not consistently affect the responses. This experimental test is evidence that the responses and results were not driven by accidental details of question framing.

A summary of significant marginal effects for each single statement is available in the Appendix (Table A2). The table shows fairly consistent associations of acceptance with age, gender, news behavior and and party identification. Overall, the pattern suggests that the relationships (coefficient signs) are fairly stable across statements and policy domains.

Table. 4. Association of the acceptance of false or biased claims with individual characteristics: marginal effects from logistic regression models.

Variable (reference level)	Level	All 20 statements ^a	Statements by status ^b		Single statements ^c	
			Corrected	Uncorrected	U1 ^d	V1 ^d
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Wording	Wording A	0.012	0.004	0.012	0.000	-0.041*
Age (<40)	Age 40-64	0.002	-0.020	0.040*	0.019	-0.017
	Age 65+	0.044**	0.052*	0.084***	0.063*	-0.057*
Gender	Female	-0.036**	-0.050**	-0.045**	-0.063***	0.013
Education (low)	Edu medium	-0.063**	-0.081*	-0.071*	-0.145**	0.025
	Edu high	-0.053**	-0.033	-0.057*	-0.053	0.075*
Income (<5000)	5000-9'999	0.021	0.021	0.044**	0.028	0.002
	10k-14'999	-0.019	-0.005	0.000	-0.015	-0.125***
	15'000+	0.081*	0.057	0.035	-0.021	0.040
	DNK/NR	0.028	0.005	0.041	-0.011	-0.069**
Residence (rural)	Urban	-0.028	0.024	-0.028	0.052	-0.024
	Intermediate	0.003	0.017	0.013	0.036	-0.046
	DNK/NR	-0.044	0.070	-0.048	0.135*	-0.020
News time (<30 min.)	30-59 min.	0.058*	0.091*	0.044	0.171***	0.073*
	60-119 min.	0.053*	0.091**	0.049	0.147***	0.050
	20+ min.	0.072**	0.160***	0.073*	0.202***	0.059
	NDK/NR	0.026	0.002	0.083	0.044	0.118
Trust in gov. (high)	medium	-0.041**	-0.068**	-0.040	-0.069**	-0.060**
	low	-0.021	-0.074***	-0.002	-0.102***	-0.031
Party id. (Center)	People's Party	-0.069	-0.104**	-0.052	-0.109*	-0.128***
	Social Dem.	0.051*	0.122***	0.023	0.214***	0.077*
	Liberals	0.066**	0.069	0.064	0.066	0.023
	Greens	0.085***	0.172***	0.051	0.265***	0.146***
	EVP	0.009	0.134	0.075	0.289***	0.000
	Green Liberals	0.032	0.087**	0.058	0.167***	0.054
	Alternative Left	0.057	-0.076	-0.016	-0.129	0.082
	Other	-0.089	0.018	-0.135	-0.153	-0.015
	No Party	-0.098*	-0.056	-0.137**	-0.044	0.001
	Several	-0.051	-0.014	-0.090	0.032	-0.004
	DNK/NR	-0.102	-0.042	-0.113	-0.060	-0.168**
Primary news source (SRG SSR)	TX Group	0.033	-0.033	0.049	0.065	-0.025
	CH Media	0.020	0.056	0.015	0.025	-0.002
	NZZ Group	0.040	-0.042	0.084**	0.025	-0.175***
	Weltwoche	-0.282***	-0.418***	-0.393***	-0.385***	n.a.
	Republik	n.a.	n.a.	0.058	0.294***	0.160
	Other	0.011	-0.068	0.034	0.005	-0.087**
Second news source (SRG SSR)	TX Group	-0.026	-0.067*	-0.001	-0.072	-0.092*
	CH Media	-0.004	-0.034	-0.004	-0.063	-0.052
	NZZ Group	-0.057	-0.166***	-0.047	-0.144***	-0.131**
	Nau	-0.002	0.006	0.064	-0.027	0.056
	Somedia	-0.058	-0.193*	-0.017	-0.110	0.055
	Weltwoche	-0.063	-0.174**	-0.097	-0.354***	-0.036
	Republik	0.006	0.052	0.047	0.064	-0.090
	WOZ	-0.045	-0.182*	0.006	-0.156	-0.010
	Other	-0.028	-0.070*	-0.005	-0.101***	-0.042
	DNK/NR	-0.093	-0.149**	-0.051	-0.138	0.005
N		1550	1550	1566	1566	1538
Likelihood-ratio		150.6	227.7	124.5	288.5	136.4
Pseudo-R ²		0.145	0.134	0.085	0.136	0.077

Notes: Estimates are discrete effects (relative to reference) from logit regressions of proportions (models 1 to 5) and binary outcomes (6 and 7). DNK/NR: Don't know/no response; n.a.: variable not estimable due to collinearity. ^{a/b} Dependent variable is proportion of "fully agree" among responses to 20 / 10 questions; ^c Binary dependent variable: (1: "fully agree"; 0: otherwise). ^d Statements see Appendix Table A1. Significance levels. *: <0.1; **: <0.05; ***: <0.01.

4.4. Media trust, media expectations, and general values

Figure 2 shows the distribution of respondents' expectations of the news media (upper diagram) and responses about more general values (bottom diagram) in the weighted sample. A large majority of the respondents “fully” or “rather” agreed on the first two statements “*The media should be committed above all to the truth*” and “*In crises and conflicts the media should report impartially*”. At the same time, however, many also agreed on the statement “*In crises the media should support the government*” and “*In international conflicts the media should represent the interests of their country.*” The distribution of values shows a slight preference in the population for cooperation over independence and a clear preference for less rather than more immigration.




Figure 2. Responses to questions about expectations of the media and general societal values. (See text for full statements.)

Table 5 examines how the proportion of acceptance („fully agree“-responses across all twenty statements) is associated with these expectations and values, along with the variable for trust in the traditional media. The first model includes only *Trust in media* and the variables for

expectations. The second model adds the variables for general values. Acceptance of misinformation increased with trust in the traditional media. A one-category increase on the 5-point scale was associated with a increase in the proportion of fully accepted statements by about 0.05 (Model 1). Regarding expectations, acceptance of misinformation was higher (+0.076) among those who expected the media to be “committed above all to the truth” and slightly higher (+0.027) among those who expected the media to “report impartially” and to “support the government in crises”. Regarding general values, which were measured on a 6-point scale, acceptance of misinformation was somewhat lower among those who valued national independence above international cooperation. The values regarding immigration were not significantly associated with the acceptance of misinformation.

Table 5. Association of acceptance of misinformation across all 20 statements with media trust, media expectations, and values: marginal effects from logistic regression models.

Variable	Model 1		Model 2	
	Marginal effect	z	Marginal effect	z
Trust in media	0.049	7.35***	0.042	5.76***
Expect committed to truth	0.075	4.79***	0.076	4.73***
Expect report impartially	0.027	2.06**	0.027	2.08**
Expect support government	0.020	2.78***	0.017	2.33**
Expect support national interest	-0.012	-1.77*	-0.006	-0.87
Value independence (vs. cooperation)	—	—	-0.016	-2.8***
Value less immigration (vs. more i.)	—	—	0.003	0.46
N	1523		1514	
Likelihood-ratio	122.2		130.0	
Pseudo- R^2	0.121		0.130	

Notes: ME: Estimates are marginal effects from logit regressions of proportions. Significance levels. *: <0.1; **: <0.05; ***: <0.01. ^a Variable description and coding see Table 2.

5 Discussion

The main findings of study are threefold. First, false or misleading claims aligned with mainstream narratives on important international issues were accepted by up to 50 percent of the population. Second, acceptance of misinformation was consistently associated with individual-level variables, and the pattern of associations differed substantially from patterns in research on non-mainstream misinformation. Third, based on responses to supplementary questions, the Swiss mainstream media fail to deliver on news media consumers’ perceptions and expectations of truthful reporting; misinformation in mainstream media may thus undermine unbiased opinion formation on issues concerning foreign relations and policy. The

following paragraphs discuss these findings in turn, followed by final paragraphs on limitations and directions for future research.

The examined false or misleading claims arguably concerned some of the most important international issues of our time. Based on an epistemically rooted definition of misinformation, the dominant narratives in Western mainstream media have been misleading their audiences on important issues regarding foreign relations and policies. The survey responses suggest that dominant narratives in Western news media can determine what large parts of the population believe even if the narratives are false or misleading. While this has been found before in exemplary cases, the present results on a variety of issues suggest that misinformation that may benefit Western interests may be a fairly common phenomenon in Western mainstream media. The empirical results also confirm earlier findings that correction of misinformation is not always effective (Lewandowski et al. 2005).

The individual-level variables associated with the acceptance of misinformation, including political ideology, news behavior, and trust in government are largely consistent with the literature on misinformation in social and other non-legacy media. However, the direction of effects was often opposite. In particular, acceptance of misinformation was higher among the older, among women, among those who consume much news, among those with left-wing or liberal party identification, and among those with conservative or non-mainstream news as their primary or secondary news sources. A tentative explanation is that most of the existing literature has focused on issues where the misinformation was opposed to rather than aligned with mainstream views. The opposite explanatory pattern in this present study would then be the expected outcome, consistent with literature showing that prior beliefs are an important driver of misinformation acceptance (Kunda 1990).

A few details of the explanatory pattern are worth mentioning. First, the effect of education was not reversed relative to studies on non-mainstream misinformation. Those with medium and higher education were less susceptible to the misinformation. Second, those with a medium trust in government were less susceptible to misinformation than those with high trust. Similarly, those who identified with “no party” or with “several parties equally” were less susceptible to misinformation than those who identify with left-wing parties and even with those who identified with the Center party. Hence, not (only) those with prior beliefs that support motivated reasoning or competent heuristic decisions based on party cues (Schlöpfer 2011) were less susceptible to misinformation but (also) those *without* clear prior beliefs. In other words, the less politically “prejudiced” tended to correctly identify the misinformation.

One could argue that these individuals are the most interesting as their responses cannot be easily predicted from prior beliefs.

The respondents almost unanimously expected the media to be “committed mainly to the truth” and to “report impartially”. These expectations of the media point to a conflict with the observed misinformation in mainstream media on important international issues. In international news, the origin of the misinformation and a specifically Western bias is quite clear. The media in Switzerland and other European countries rely heavily on only few international sources that ideologically close to US economic and strategic interests (Udris et al. 2023, Vogler et al. 2024). It is not a coincidence or surprising that the false and misleading claims in the present study (Section 3.3) follow US-dominated ‘Western’ perspectives. For instance, the misinformation and intransparency about the origins of the war in Ukraine, the Nordstream sabotage, or the origin of Covid-19 all benefited the United States.

From a democratic perspective, of course, the misinformation and the conflict with perceptions and expectations of media that report truthfully is troubling. Moreover, if the misinformation is biased towards one particular foreign perspective, this bias must be expected to systematically influence public opinion. More specifically, control of public opinion and debate would be partly in the hands of US economic and strategic interests. The findings suggest that regulatory measures may be needed to prevent news media from undermining the ‘free formation of political will and unbiased voting’ stipulated in the Swiss constitution. A possible measure could be declaration requirements for news media to increase the public awareness of the biases in international news due to their reliance on US-aligned sources. For instance, news media could be required to declare main sources and their ideological position at the level of the media outlet and perhaps also at the level of the news report. The declaration would have to follow appropriate rules of transparency and salience as other domains where product declaration is required (Sunstein 2011). Another approach would be requirements to enhance the knowledge about and visibility of media outlets’ ownership and political orientation.

A limitation of this study – any work on misinformation about politically contested issues – concerns the fact that there is no objective truth standard. The credibility of the analysis ultimately relies on the acceptance of the underlying epistemology. The present study supports the reader’s decision to accept or dismiss the labelling of misinformation by providing information on the grounds on which the claims were labelled (cf. Table A1). Knowledge is preliminary, however, and new information may require updates on the labelling. A second limitation is that the study did not examine the discernment of misinformation,

which would require questions about both false or misleading and true or non-misleading claims (cf. Beattie & Sherstoboeva 2025). A third limitation is that most of the examined claims happen to align with Western-style liberal world views. The error of the examined claims is not ideologically random but systematic. This was not intended but rather a logical consequence of examining claims aligned with dominant narratives in Western mainstream media. A fourth limitation concerns the sample which is not based on probability sampling but drawn from a respondent panel. The sample is biased towards higher incomes, left-liberal ideology, high education, high media consumption and above-average interest in politics. The percentage acceptance of the statements should therefore be interpreted with caution even in the weighted sample (cf. Fig. 1). The analysis of the associations of acceptance with individual characteristics should be less affected by the bias, as the biased sample is sufficiently heterogeneous in all relevant variables to identify the relationships.

The study raises several questions for future research. One important question is which theoretical foundations, definitions, and procedures enable researchers to usefully identify misinformation that is aligned with dominant mainstream views. Furthermore, work on misinformation in mainstream media could look at other issue domains than those examined here. One example would be policy issues at the national level where dominant narratives can be driven by corporate interests of industries such as the agricultural, banking, energy, military pharmaceutical, or real-estate industry. Another topic for future research is potential approaches to discourage or neutralize misinformation in mainstream news media through declaration requirements (as mentioned above).

6 Conclusions

The present study used a panel survey to examine the acceptance of misinformation and its individual-level correlates including political identification, news media behavior, socioeconomic characteristics, and expectations of news media. Contrary to most existing work, the focus was on misinformation in mainstream news media on a wide range of international political issues. An epistemically rooted definition of misinformation was used to identify misinformation aligned with dominant narratives definition, and a principled measurement approach accounts for the complexity of politically relevant misinformation.

Based on population-weighted responses to twenty examined claims, up to 50 % of the population accepted misinformation on important international issues. For misinformation that had been fully or partly corrected by public authorities, the acceptance ranged up to 47 %

of the population. Significant individual-level correlates of misinformation acceptance included higher age, male gender, low education, time spent with news (30 minutes per day or more), high trust in government (relative to medium), left-wing or liberal party identification (relative to Center, „several parties equally“, and „no party“), and mainstream news sources (relative to a non-mainstream source). The factors associated with the acceptance of misinformation were similar to those reported for non-mainstream misinformation, but the direction of the effects was often opposite. The pattern of effects in the existing literature may be linked with the focus on misinformation opposed to dominant narratives of mainstream news organizations. Looking at the substance of the misinformation, the examined misinformation was often aligned with Western economic and strategic interests. The systematic bias may not be intentional but simply reflect the well-documented heavy reliance of Swiss media on US-aligned international sources (Vogler et al. 2024). The responses to some supplementary survey questions about media consumers' perceptions and expectations of truthful and impartial media point to disconnect between perceptions and the reality of today's news media. The findings raise uneasy questions about the influence of misinformation on the formation of political opinions and on voting behavior in ballot decision concerning international relations and policies. They indicate that there may be a need for regulatory measures to improve the transparency and salience of biased sources to protect media quality and competent opinion formation about international issues.

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Appendix

Table A1: Statements and classification (+: partly or fully corrected by officials of the interested party; -: otherwise)

Label	Statement	Status ^a	Why labelled as misinformatin?
U1	Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an unprovoked war of aggression.	1	A, B
U2	Russia under Putin is a threat to all of Europe.	0	A
U3	NATO's eastward expansion is not a serious threat to Russia.	1	A
U4	The removal of the pro-Russian Ukrainian government in 2014 (Euromaidan protests) was a revolution that came from the people.	0	A, B
U5	The idea that the US and the UK stood in the way of a peace treaty between Ukraine and Russia in the spring of 2022 is a conspiracy theory.	0	A, B
U6	The current crisis in the German economy has little to do with sanctions against Russia and the resulting high energy prices.	0	A, B
U7	The Minsk II agreement with Russia (2016) was a serious peace effort by Ukraine, France, and Germany that was undermined by Russia.	1	A, B
U8	The US never promised Russia that NATO would not expand eastward.	1	A, B
U9	In the terrorist attack on the Nord Stream pipeline, the German government's main suspicion is focused on a Ukrainian who is wanted on an arrest warrant.	0	A, C
U10	At the beginning of the war in Ukraine, a Ukrainian fighter pilot (the "Ghost of Kiev") shot down numerous Russian aircraft in just a few days.	1	A
V1	The origin of the COVID-19 pandemic (coronavirus) is probably a transmission of the virus from an animal to a human.	1	A, B, C
V2	The COVID-19 vaccines (coronavirus vaccines) from Moderna and Pfizer prevented the transmission of the virus.	1	A, B
V3	China operates a social credit system based on extensive surveillance of the population, which can lead to restrictions in everyday life if a person's score is low.	0	A, B
V4	China's statisticians have been publishing embellished economic growth figures for years.	0	A
V5	Russia and China deliberately destroyed sea cables in 2024.	1	A, B
V6	Trump collaborated with Russian propagandists during his 2016 election campaign.	1	A, B, C
V7	Speculation that child sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein collaborated with American and Israeli intelligence agencies is a far-fetched conspiracy theory.	0	A, B, C
V8	American weapons inspectors found evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein's Iraq.	1	A
V9	Only military means can now prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.	0	A
V10	There was no contact between Lee Harvey Oswald—the assassin of US President John F. Kennedy (1963)—and the American intelligence agency CIA.	0	B, C

Notes: ^a 1/0: partly or fully corrected/not corrected before the date of the survey. Sources see Supplement S1. A: missing, weak or inconclusive evidence; B: important information is missing; C: important information about relevant authority's lack of transparency is missing.

Table A2. Association of the acceptance of each statement with individual-level variables.
Significant coefficients from logistic regression models.

Variable (reference level)		Topic and statement label ^a																			
		War im Ukraine										Pandemic		China and Russia				U. S. intelligence			
		U1	U2	U3	U4	U5	U6	U7	U8	U9	U10	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8	V9	V10
Wording	Wording A											—			—			—			
Age (<40)	Age 40-64			***	***	***	***	***	***	***			—*			+		+		+	
	Age 65+	+	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***		—			***						
Gender	Female	—**		—**	—**	—**	—**	—**	—**	—**				—*	—*	—**		—**		—**	—**
Education (low)	Edu medium	—**			—*															+	
	Edu high										+	+				+		—*	—	+	
Income (<5000)	5000-9'999												+							***	
	10k-14'999											—**									
	15'000+		+								/		+					/			
	DNK/NR											—*		—*				—			
Residence (rural)	Urban		—*		***		+							—				—			
	Intermediate				***					+				—*					+		
	DNK/NR	+			+		+			+		+						+			
News time (<30 min.)	30-59 min.	***		+	+	+						+	+		+						
	60-119 min.	***	+	***	***	***	+	***		***					***	+	***				
	20+ min.	***	***	***	***	***	+	***		***			+	+	***	***	***			+	
	NDK/NR																				
Trust gov. (high)	medium	—*				—*		—**	*	—		—*	—**							—**	
	low	—**			—*	—**				—			—**					—*	+	—**	
Party id. (Center)	People' Party	—*	—**		—*		***	—				—**			—*						
	Social Dem.	***	+									+	+	—*		+			—**		
	Liberals						+						+								
	Greens	***	***						—*			***						—			
	EVP	***					+														
	Green Lib.	***	***										+								
	Alt. Left		—**	/			+								—				/		
	Clearly o.		—*		—															/	
	No Party		—**																		
	Several		—*	—*		—			—	—			—	—**				—**		+	
	DNK/NR				/							—		—	/	/		—**	/		/
Primary news source (SRG SSR)	TX Group		+						—*								—**	+			
	CH Media		+														—**		—		
	NZZ Group										—**	—**			+	—**			+		
	Weltwoche	—**	/	—**	—**	—*	—	/		—*	/	/	—*	—**	—*	/	/		—**	/	
	Republik	***	***								/							—	/	/	
	Other										—*		*	—				—**			
Second source (SRG SSR)	TX Group			—								—*					—*				
	CH Media			—*										—*			—*				
	NZZ Group	—**		—*							—*	—*					—**				
	Nau					+	—*											+		+	
	Somedia						+			/	/						—*	/			
	Weltwoche	—**	—*	—*	—	—					/						—*				
	Republik							+													
	WOZ					+							—*						/		
	Other	—*															—				
	DNK/NR			—**	—**				/								—*				
Percent „fully agree“ ^{a,b}		47.4	49.8	18.9	21.3	21.3	17.8	14.2	11.1	7.5	5.8	21.2	17.9	35.5	21.3	18.8	13.7	16.4	6.1	16.6	8.3
Percent DNK/NR ^b		4.4	1.2	7.0	31.6	35.9	7.7	46.1	39.8	46.6	62.8	14.3	3.9	19.5	22.7	32.6	29.5	41.7	27.9	11.8	53.4
Number of obs.		1566	1538	1551	1566	1548	1566	1538	1566	1508	1445	1538	1566	1566	1548	1520	1538	1566	1498	1513	1480
Prob. > Chi ²		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.224	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.007
Pseudo-R ²		0.136	0.090	0.090	0.101	0.077	0.068	0.120	0.070	0.057	0.120	0.077	0.077	0.042	0.046	0.076	0.063	0.062	0.179	0.151	0.077

Notes: +/–: pos./neg. association (p<0.1); *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01. /: not estimable. ^a See Appendix Table A1 for statements. ^b In weighted sample.

Supplementary material

S1 Sources: evidence and media examples

S2 Model estimates, Table A2

S3 Survey questionnaire

Supplement S1: Sources: evidence and media examples

Statements are followed by sources attesting inadequate support of the claim (preceded by dark circles) including sources reporting official corrections (marked with an asterisk*) and examples of the use of similar biased or false claims in Swiss and international mass media outlets (preceded by empty circles). Priority was given to the outlets *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, *Tagesanzeiger*, and *New York Times*.

U1C) Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an unprovoked war of aggression.

- <https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-trump-war-zelenskyy-putin-7fe8c0c80b4e93e3bc079c621a44e8bb> *
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jp3-Ph5lnuo> *
- <https://www.politico.com/news/2025/02/23/witkoff-ukraine-russia-trump-war-nato-00205626> *
- <https://kyivindependent.com/hollande-there-will-only-be-a-way-out-of-the-conflict-when-russia-fails-on-the-ground/>
- <https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/in-edicola/articoli/2025/09/13/sachs-macron-mi-disse-che-la-guerra-in-ucraina-e-tutta-colpa-della-nato/8125413/>
- Münger, Christoph (February 23, 2022). Putin beginnt einen neuen Kalten Krieg. *Tagesanzeiger*, p. 1. <https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/putin-startet-den-kalten-krieg-2-0-758780382334>
- Raphaela Birrer (Editor-in-Chief) (February 24, 2022). Jetzt muss der Bundesrat Haltung zeigen. *Tagesanzeiger*, p. 6. <https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/jetzt-muss-der-bundesrat-haltung-zeigen-966761813447>
- White House (February 23, 2022). Statement by President Biden on Russia's Unprovoked and Unjustified Attack on Ukraine. <https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/23/statement-by-president-biden-on-russias-unprovoked-and-unjustified-attack-on-ukraine/>
- New York Times Editorial Board (February 24, 2022) Mr. Putin Launches a Sequel to the Cold War. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/opinion/putin-biden-ukraine-russia.html?searchResultPosition=44>

U2U) Russia under Putin is a threat to all of Europe.

- <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/02/russia-putin-nato-warning-war-west/> ("*The idea that Russia wants to march to the Atlantic is nonsense... Putin has no desire to conquer Europe.*")
- <https://www.stimson.org/2025/emma-ashford-where-do-american-interests-end/> / ("*The 'Russia threat to all Europe' is a fundraising pitch for defense contractors, not strategy.*")
- Rüesch, Andreas (February 25, 2022). Der Westen muss Putins Kalkül durchkreuzen. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, p. 17.
- Rüesch, Andreas (January 12, 2024). In der Ukraine entlarven sich Irrtümer über die moderne Kriegführung – nur wer die richtigen Lehren zieht, bleibt sicher.

<https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/der-ukraine-krieg-entlarvt-fehler-nun-kommt-es-auf-die-lehren-an-ld.1773806>

- Gujer, Eric (Editor-in-Chief) (April 22, 2023). Auf Kollisionskurs. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 1.
- LETA/TBT Staff (February 18, 2025). Russia now threatens the whole of Europe – Frederiksen. https://www.baltictimes.com/russia_now_threatens_the_whole_of_europe_-_frederiksen/
- Associated Press (June 28, 2025). EU's top diplomat warns that Russia has a plan for long-term aggression against Europe. <https://apnews.com/article/europe-eu-russia-sabotage-threat-attack-nato-428d488080c17f6c322c9553a301b6dc>

U3C) NATO's eastward expansion is not a serious threat to Russia.

- <https://www.politico.com/news/2025/02/23/witkoff-ukraine-russia-trump-war-nato-00205626> *
- https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_218172.htm?selectedLocale=en
- <https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/in-edicola/articoli/2025/09/13/sachs-macron-mi-disse-che-la-guerra-in-ucraina-e-tutta-colpa-della-nato/8125413/> *
- <https://www.jeffsachs.org/newspaper-articles/nato-chief-admits-expansion-behind-russian-invasion>
- Münger, Christoph (February 23, 2022). Putin beginnt einen neuen Kalten Krieg. Tagesanzeiger, p. 1. <https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/putin-startet-den-kalten-krieg-2-0-758780382334>
- Gujer, Eric (Editor-in-Chief) (February 26, 2022). Putin greift auch dem Westen an. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 1.
- New York Times Editorial Board (February 24, 2022) Mr. Putin Launches a Sequel to the Cold War. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/opinion/putin-biden-ukraine-russia.html?searchResultPosition=44>
- Nienhuijsen, Frank (February 24, 2022). Putin fühlt sich von der Ukraine bedroht – das Volk nicht. Tagesanzeiger. p. 6. <https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/putin-fuehlt-sich-von-der-ukraine-bedroht-das-russische-volk-nicht-601947247843>

U4U) The removal of the pro-Russian Ukrainian government in 2014 (Euromaidan protests) was a revolution that came from the people.

- <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957>
- Mijnsen, Ivo (March 17, 2022). Vom Maidan in den Krieg. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 2. *(No mention of the role of the U. S., Ukrainian oligarchs, or extreme nationalists.)*
- Bigalke, Silke; Hassel, Florian (February 23, 2022). Der Brandstifter versetzt die Welt in Schrecken. (With section/box on the history of the conflict: Der Konflikt um die Ukraine dauert seit acht Jahren an.) Tagesanzeiger, p. 2. *(Only mentions that Putin called Ukraine's government a «puppet regime». No other mention of the role of the U. S., Ukrainian oligarchs, or extreme nationalists.)*
- Santora, Marc; Pérez-Peña, Richard (November 21, 2022). Ukraine Remembers a Milestone on the Long Path to Putin's War.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/21/world/europe/ukraine-maidan-protests-anniversary.html>

(Only mentions: «The Kremlin called the sequence of events a Western-backed coup.». No other mention of the role of the U. S., Ukrainian oligarchs, or extreme nationalists.)

U5U) The idea that the US and the UK stood in the way of a peace treaty between Ukraine and Russia in the spring of 2022 is a conspiracy theory.¹

- Charap, Samuel & Radchenko, Sergey (April 16, 2024). The Talks That Could Have Ended the War in Ukraine. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/talks-could-have-ended-war-ukraine>
- Rüesch, Andreas (June 13, 2025). Die Legende vom verhinderten Frieden. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 5. <https://www.nzz.ch/international/ukraine-krieg-blockierte-der-westen-2022-einen-frieden-mit-russland-ld.1834618>
- Freund, Nicolas; Gierke Sebastian (February 24, 2023). Ein Frieden ist nicht in Sicht. Tagesanzeiger, p. 4.
- Nechepurenko, Ivan (April 7, 2025). Hopes for peace talks dim as Russia raises objections and Belarus demands to take part. https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/04/07/world/ukraine-russia-war-news?state=default&variant=show&block=storyline_levelup_swipe_recirc#hopes-for-peace-talks-dim-as-russia-raises-objections-and-belarus-demands-to-take-part
(No mention of any role and influence of U. S. or U. K.)
- Walker, Shaun (February 12, 2025). Zelenskyy rejects claim Boris Johnson talked him out of 2022 peace deal <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/12/zelenskyy-rejects-claim-boris-johnson-talked-him-out-of-2022-peace-deal>

U6U) The current crisis in the German economy has little to do with sanctions against Russia and the resulting high energy prices.²

- <https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-war-costs-germanys-economy-100-billion/a-64768176>
- Höltschi, René (March 22, 2025). Die deutsche Energiewende ist teuer geworden. Wie Friedrich Merz die Kosten senken könnte <https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/energiewende-wie-deutschland-die-kosten-senken-koennte-ld.1876499> *(Focuses on electricity an transition to renewables, no mention of Russia sancions.)*

¹ There are indications that Victoria Nuland confirmed that the US sabotaged the peace treaty. They are not interpreted as official correction here. <https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/victoria-nuland-ukraine-peace-deal>

² German Minister Habeck and others warned early in the war, but there has not been any official recognition of actual impacts. <https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-germany-economy-idUSL5N2V62OR/>

- Bockenheimer, Johannes C. (January 22, 2025). Die deutsche Wirtschaftskrise verschärft sich. <https://www.nzz.ch/international/die-deutsche-wirtschaft-schlittert-immer-tiefer-in-die-krise-und-verliert-die-geduld-mit-der-politik-ld.1867178> (*No mention of Russia sancions.*)

U7C) The Minsk II agreement with Russia (2016) was a serious peace effort by Ukraine, France, and Germany that was undermined by Russia. Die Zeit (online), 7.12.2022; Hollande in einem Interview der ukrainischen Staatszeitung „Kyiv Independent“ am 16. Dezember 2022 in Paris.)

- Prouvost, Theo (December 28, 2022). Hollande: ‘There will only be a way out of the conflict when Russia fails on the ground’. <https://kyivindependent.com/hollande-there-will-only-be-a-way-out-of-the-conflict-when-russia-fails-on-the-ground/> *
- Hildebrandt, Tina; di Lorenzo, Giovanni (December 7, 2022). Hatten Sie gedacht, ich komme mit Pferdeschwanz? Die Zeit. Nr. 51. <https://www.zeit.de/2022/51/angela-merkel-russland-fluechtlingskrise-bundeskanzler> *
- Münger, Christoph (February 23, 2022). Putin beginnt einen neuen Kalten Krieg. Tagesanzeiger, p. 1. <https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/putin-startet-den-kalten-krieg-2-0-758780382334> (*"Nebenbei hat er das Minsker Abkommen geschreddert, eigentlich die Grundlage für die friedliche Beilegung des Konflikts."*)
- Agence France-Presse AFP/bru (February 19, 2015) Merkel, Hollande, Poroschenko und Putin sehen «Bruch» der Waffenruhe. <https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/merkel-hollande-poroschenko-und-putin-sehen-bruch-der-waffenruhe-668976446357>

U8C) The US never promised Russia that NATO would not expand eastward.

- <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early> *
- <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard> *
- <http://opiniojuris.org/2022/03/11/why-24-does-not-always-add-up-in-search-of-natos-non-enlargement-promises/> *
- Adomeit, Hannes (February 21, 2022). Putin beruft sich auf eine Zusage, die es nie gab. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 3. Das heikle Gleichgewicht in Europa bewahren. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 2. <https://www.nzz.ch/international/hat-die-nato-bei-der-osterweiterung-gegenueber-russland-gelogen-ld.1669445>
- Cornelius, Stefan (December 23, 2021). Der angebliche Verrat des Westens an der Sowjetunion. Tagesanzeiger, p. 7. <https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/der-angebliche-verrat-des-westens-an-der-udssr-928042426678> (*Main text is more nuanced than title.*)
- Münger, Christoph (March 25, 2022). „Die Osterweiterung war kein Fehler“. Tagesanzeiger, p. 2. <https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/die-nato-osterweiterung-war-kein-fehler-258993727389>
- Neal, Jeff. (March 16, 2022). ‘There was no promise not to enlarge NATO’. Harvard Law Today. <https://hls.harvard.edu/today/there-was-no-promise-not-to-enlarge-nato/>

- Rothman, Noah. (March 25, 2022). Madeleine Albright's NATO expansion helped keep Russia in check. MSNBC. <https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/madeline-albright-used-nato-shrink-russia-s-influence-n1293001>
- Fisher, Max. (February 24, 2022). Putin's Case for War, Annotated. The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/europe/putin-ukraine-speech.html>
- Michel, Casey. (February 24, 2022). Why does Russia want to invade Ukraine? To rewrite the post-Cold War order. <https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/why-does-russia-want-invade-ukraine-ask-putin-ncna1288996>

U9U) In the terrorist attack on the Nord Stream pipeline, the German government's main suspicion is focused on a Ukrainian who is wanted on an arrest warrant.

(Missing information and intransparency raises doubts about the limited information that is available.)

- Schmitt, Jörg; Weinmann, Lea (August 15, 2024) Ukrainer per Haftbefehl gesucht. Tagesanzeiger, p. 10. <https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/anschlag-auf-nord-stream-pipelines-diese-personen-werden-verdaechtigt-203315669587> *(Mentions that the Polish investigators «had not encountered the suspect at his home», but not whether they were interested in also looking elsewhere.)*
- Kaponen, Linda (November 20, 2024). Ein weiterer Sabotageakt in der Ostsee? Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 2. <https://www.nzz.ch/international/datenkabel-in-der-ostsee-beschaedigt-ein-hybrider-angriff-von-russland-ld.1858121> *(Mentions that responsibility for Nordstream is unknown but «latest investigations hint towards Ukraine», «although it could equally well be a false-flag operation of the Kremlin».)*
- Maksan, Oliver (August 15, 2024). Haftbefehl gegen Ukrainer wegen Pipeline-Anschlag. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 4. <https://www.nzz.ch/international/nord-stream-anschlag-laut-berichten-haftbefehl-gegen-ukrainer-erhoben-ld.1843641> *(4000 characters article without any critical classification)*
- Anderson, Christina (September 27, 2022). Leaks in undersea gas pipelines from Russia to Germany after blasts raise suspicions of sabotage. *(Cites an unknowing U. S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken: “There are initial reports indicating that this may be the result of an attack or some kind of sabotage, but these are initial reports and we haven’t confirmed that yet.”)* <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/09/27/world/russia-ukraine-war-news#sweden-recorded-heavy-undersea-explosions-before-the-gas-leaks-were-detected>

U10C) At the beginning of the war in Ukraine, a Ukrainian fighter pilot (the “Ghost of Kiev”) shot down numerous Russian aircraft in just a few days.

- Bubola, Emma (May 1, 2022). Ukraine acknowledges that the ‘Ghost of Kyiv’ is a myth. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/01/world/europe/ghost-kyiv-ukraine-myth.html> *
- Rüesch, Andreas (March 14, 2025). Das Rätsel am ukrainischen Himmel. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 3. <https://www.nzz.ch/international/ukraine-russlands-luftwaffe-gibt-mit-ihrem-verhalten-raetsel-auf-ld.1674344> *

- Gierke, Sebastian; Käppner, Joachim (March, 19, 2022). «Die Ukrainer müssen nicht siegen – sie dürfen nur nicht verlieren». Tagesanzeiger, p. 2.
<https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/die-ukrainer-muessen-nicht-gewinnen-sie-duerfen-nur-nicht-verlieren-932896045493>
- Anonymous (February 26, 2022). «Geist von Kiew» soll sechs russische Flugzeuge abgeschossen haben. <https://www.blick.ch/ausland/hoffnung-kommt-in-form-eines-kampfjetpilots-geist-von-kiew-soll-sechs-russische-flugzeuge-abgeschossen-haben-id17271655.html>
- Anonymous (February 26, 2022). Dieser Kampfjet soll der «Ghost of Kyiv» sein. <https://www.blick.ch/ausland/er-gibt-ukrainern-hoffnung-dieser-kampfjet-soll-der-ghost-of-kyiv-sein-id17271455.html>
- Anonymous (April 30, 2022). Der Geist von Kiew ist tot. <https://www.blick.ch/ausland/mysterioeser-kampfjetpilot-stepan-tarabalka-29-abgeschossen-der-geist-von-kiew-ist-tot-id17448862.html>
- Shashkova, Maryna (February 25, 2022). The Ghost of Kyiv: Who Is the Legendary Pilot of the Russo-Ukrainian War? <https://www.kyivpost.com/post/28468>

V1C) The origin of the COVID-19 pandemic (coronavirus) is likely to be the transmission of the virus from an animal to a human.

- <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cia-covid-likely-originated-lab-low-confidence-assessment/>
- <https://www.whitehouse.gov/lab-leak-true-origins-of-covid-19/>
- <https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/die-theorie-vom-laborunfall-ist-vom-tisch-587196323760>
- <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/business/media/coronavirus-tom-cotton-china.html>

V2C) The COVID-19 vaccines (coronavirus vaccines) from Moderna and Pfizer prevented the transmission of the virus.

- <https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/108440> *
- <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/05/health/us-coronavirus-thursday/index.html> *
- <https://www.srf.ch/news/abstimmungen-28-november-2021/covid-gesetz/covid-gesetz-alain-beret-das-covid-zertifikat-ist-der-weg-aus-der-krise> * (*Correction of statement: "With the certificate you can show that you are not contagious", has caused many reactions. The statement is like this not precise; it is known that vaccinated and Recovered people can be contagious.*)
- <https://www.srf.ch/play/tv/10-vor-10/video/10-vor-10-vom-27-10-2021?urn=urn:srf:video:dfeb5b8c-c00c-42f8-a7ba-0d1baa323fc8>
- Straumann, Felix (October, 28 2022). Der wahre Impfskandal. <https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/der-wahre-impfskandal-729716177605> («Once again, social media and "Weltwoche" claim that we have been lied to, cheated and betrayed about Corona. That is nonsense»)
- <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-dr-anthony-fauci-face-the-nation-05-16-2021/> (Fauci, interview: "When you get vaccinated, you not only protect your own

health... but you become a dead end to the virus. And when there are a lot of dead ends around, the virus is not going to go anywhere.")

- <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/15/world/europe/ursula-von-der-leyen-eu-speech.html> (*Von der Leyen, speech: "Fully vaccinated people are safely protected against the disease and do not transmit the virus."*)
- https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2021/07/13/covid-19-emmanuel-macron-contraint-de-mettre-un-coup-de-frein-au-virus-et-a-ses-reformes_6088090_823448.html (*Macron, national address: "La vaccination protège et empêche de transmettre le virus."*)

V3U) China operates a social credit system based on extensive surveillance of the population, which can lead to restrictions in everyday life if a person's score is low.

- <https://merics.org/en/comment/chinas-social-credit-score-untangling-myth-reality>
- <https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/messy-truth-about-social-credit>
- Liessmann, Konrad Paul (April 6, 2018). Bitte bewerten! Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 11. <https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/kolumnen/kopie-von-bitte-bewerten-ld.1362966>
- Müller, Armin (April 24, 2024) «Die Euphorie über KI ist gefährlich». Tagesanzeiger, p. 7. <https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/ai-die-euphorie-ist-gefaehrlich-sagt-mathias-binswanger-285925311074> (*Assumes „the social credit system in China“ is common knowledge.*)
- Brooks, David (March 11, 2019). If Stalin Had a Smartphone. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/opinion/internet-technology-stalin-dictators.html?searchResultPosition=14>

V4U) China's statisticians have been publishing embellished economic growth figures for years.

- <https://www.frbsf.org/research-and-insights/publications/economic-letter/2013/03/reliability-chinese-output-figures/>
- <https://www.frbsf.org/research-and-insights/blog/sf-fed-blog/2020/9/24/assessing-accuracy-china-economic-rebound-covid-19/>
- https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PEA4200/PEA4289-1/RAND_PEA4289-1.pdf
- <https://www.newsweek.com/china-hiding-gdp-data-according-analysis-1866760>
- <https://www.ft.com/content/961b4b32-3fce-11e9-b896-fe36ec32aece>

V5C) Russia and China deliberately destroyed undersea cables in 2024.

- Miller, Greg; Dixon, Robyn; Stanley-Becker, Isaac (January 19, 2025). Accidents, Not Russians, to Blame for Undersea Cable. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/19/russia-baltic-undersea-cables-accidents-sabotage/> *
- Kaponen, Linda (November 20, 2024). Ein weiterer Sabotageakt in der Ostsee? Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 2. <https://www.nzz.ch/international/datenkabel-in-der-ostsee->

beschadigt-ein-hybrider-angriff-von-russland-ld.1858121 (*Cites German defence minister Boris Pistorius «"Nobody believes that these cables were accidentally cut."*)

- Kaponen, Linda (December 6, 2024). Die Nato muss die Sabotageakte in der Ostsee beenden. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 22. <https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/nato-muss-den-sabotageakten-in-der-ostsee-ein-ende-setzen-ld.1860676>
- Kaponen, Linda (December 27, 2025). Fünf Unterseekabel in der Ostsee beschädigt. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 6.
- Zoll, Patrick (January 6, 2025). Frachtschiff zerstört Datenkabel an der Achillesferse Taiwans. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 3.
- Mäder, Lukas (January 13, 2025). Finland zeigt, wie man hybride Angriffe kontert. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 6. <https://www.nzz.ch/pro/russland-ostsee-unterseekabl-wie-soll-europa-auf-die-hybriden-angriffe-des-kremls-reagieren-finnland-macht-es-vor-und-entert-in-der-ostsee-ein-russisches-schiff-ld.1864627>
- (DPA) (November 22, 2024). Dänisches Militärüberwacht Frachter. Tagesanzeiger, p. 10.
- (January 15, 2025). Mit Drohnen gegen die russische Schattenflotte. Tagesanzeiger, p. 10. <https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/nato-will-gegen-sabotage-durch-russische-schattenflotte-vorgehen-150841473974>

V6UC) Trump collaborated with Russian propagandists during his 2016 election campaign.

- <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/24/us/politics/mueller-report-summary.html>
- <https://apnews.com/article/durham-justice-trump-russia-8d50b5f7cbff6670afbb2d866f06edb7>
- Batthyany, Sacha (May 11, 2017). Die Entlassung von FBI-Direktor Comey. James Comey wird nicht verschwinden. Tagesanzeiger, p. 2. <https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/james-comey-wird-nicht-verschwinden-254158595955>
- Yourish, Karen (February 2, 2028). Confused by all the news about Russia and the 2016 presidential election? We are here to help. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/10/us/politics/trump-and-russia.html>

V7U) Speculation that child sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein collaborated with American and Israeli intelligence agencies is a far-fetched conspiracy theory.

(*Claim also/mainly implied by lack of reporting on the potentially important matter.*)

- <https://www.newsweek.com/jeffrey-epstein-files-conspiracy-ghislaine-maxwell-mossad-agent-10898607>
- <https://www.skeptic.com/article/did-jeffrey-epstein-belong-to-intelligence/>
- <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/16/opinion/epstein-trump-scandal.html>
- <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/19/epstein-trump-jfk-cia-conspiracy/>

V8C) American weapons inspectors found evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

- Jehl, Douglas (July 9, 2004). Report Says Key Assertions Leading to War Were Wrong. <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/09/national/report-says-key-assertions-leading-to-war-were-wrong.html> *
- A.R. (February 7, 2003). Powell überzeugt das einheimische Publikum. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 3. <https://www.nzz.ch/newzzDBV7Z3BX-12-ld.244764>
- H.K. (February 11, 2003) Irreparable euro-atlantische Zerwürfnisse? Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 3. <https://www.nzz.ch/newzzDC0WOU5O-12-ld.245353>
- Kristoph, Nicolas D. (February 7, 2003) War and Wisdom. <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/07/opinion/war-and-wisdom.html>

V9U) Only military means can now prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

(Claim also/mainly implied by lack of contrary opinion)

- Daftari, Amir (March 27, 2025). <https://www.newsweek.com/tulsi-gabbard-iran-nuclear-weapon-2051523>
- Barnes, Julian, E. (June 19, 2025). U.S. Spy Agencies Assess Iran Remains Undecided on Building a Bomb. <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/19/us/politics/iran-nuclear-weapons-assessment.html>
- Draper, Robert (June 20, 2025). The Iran Emergency. <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/20/briefing/the-iran-emergency.html>
- <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/amid-us-iran-talks-netanyahu-says-irans-entire-nuclear-program-must-go-2025-04-27/>

V10) There was no contact between Lee Harvey Oswald—the assassin of US President John F. Kennedy (1963)—and the American intelligence agency CIA.³

- (14.07.2025). The CIA reveals more of its connections to Lee Harvey Oswald. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/07/14/cia-oswald-jfk-assassination-joannides/>
- Mink, Andreas (October 29, 2017). Das Trauma der Amerikaner. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 6. <https://www.nzz.ch/international/das-trauma-der-amerikaner-ld.1800441>
- Signer, David (March 21, 2025). Keine Enthüllung zum Mord an JFK. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, p. 5. <https://www.nzz.ch/international/kennedy-akten-die-realitaet-ist-verrueckter-als-die-verschwörungstheorien-ld.1876410>

³ New evidence which could be interpreted as an official (partial) correction was published only after the survey was conducted (JFK-files released in July 2025). <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/07/14/cia-oswald-jfk-assassination-joannides/>

Supplement S2: Model estimates of Table A2

Table S2.1. Statements U1 to U5.

Variable (reference)	Level	U1		U2		U3		U4		U5	
		dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z
Wording	Wording A	0.000	0.992	0.016	0.506	0.016	0.436	-0.031	0.144	0.004	0.836
Age (<40)	Age 40-64	0.019	0.505	0.033	0.258	0.075	0.001	0.109	0.000	0.084	0.001
	Age 65+	0.063	0.059	0.128	0.000	0.140	0.000	0.165	0.000	0.133	0.000
Gender	Female	-0.063	0.008	0.022	0.367	-0.085	0.000	-0.077	0.001	-0.121	0.000
Education (low)	Edu medium	-0.145	0.005	-0.060	0.280	0.062	0.164	-0.107	0.041	-0.080	0.123
	Edu high	-0.053	0.259	-0.040	0.435	0.055	0.171	-0.077	0.120	-0.013	0.790
Income (<5000)	5000-9'999	0.028	0.286	0.031	0.261	0.038	0.105	0.010	0.684	0.026	0.307
	10k-14'999	-0.015	0.771	0.022	0.693	0.064	0.162	0.040	0.410	0.041	0.391
	15'000+	-0.021	0.813	0.143	0.094	0.012	0.859	0.032	0.675	-0.050	0.459
	DNK/NR	-0.011	0.774	0.054	0.162	0.010	0.757	-0.029	0.401	0.040	0.276
Residence (rural)	Urban	0.052	0.192	-0.094	0.014	0.030	0.374	0.095	0.004	0.019	0.611
	Intermediate	0.036	0.429	-0.001	0.986	0.051	0.191	0.144	0.000	0.018	0.662
	DNK/NR	0.135	0.090	-0.085	0.326	0.071	0.376	0.158	0.051	0.112	0.196
News time (<30 min.)	30-59 min.	0.171	0.001	0.079	0.129	0.098	0.015	0.097	0.018	0.077	0.085
	60-119 min.	0.147	0.001	0.092	0.050	0.122	0.000	0.174	0.000	0.104	0.008
	20+ min.	0.202	0.000	0.143	0.003	0.128	0.000	0.212	0.000	0.123	0.003
	NDK/NR	0.044	0.645	0.007	0.943	0.055	0.483	0.108	0.221	-0.047	0.527
Trust gov. (high)	medium	-0.069	0.021	-0.023	0.458	-0.036	0.158	-0.012	0.675	-0.061	0.032
	low	-0.102	0.001	0.017	0.578	-0.024	0.381	-0.057	0.039	-0.113	0.000
Party id. (Center)	People' s P.	-0.109	0.048	-0.214	0.000	-0.070	0.108	-0.119	0.010	-0.051	0.293
	Social Dem.	0.214	0.000	0.091	0.043	-0.016	0.667	0.028	0.488	0.014	0.730
	Liberals	0.066	0.198	0.053	0.307	0.052	0.230	-0.010	0.829	-0.010	0.814
	Greens	0.265	0.000	0.170	0.001	0.042	0.390	0.004	0.938	0.000	0.993
	EVP	0.289	0.003	0.028	0.811	0.139	0.208	-0.026	0.796	0.087	0.421
	Green Lib.	0.167	0.001	0.135	0.005	0.065	0.128	0.009	0.832	0.050	0.260
	Alt. Left	-0.129	0.322	-0.338	0.003	n.a.	n.a.	0.104	0.415	-0.099	0.319
	Other	-0.153	0.151	-0.240	0.023	0.105	0.311	-0.163	0.053	-0.056	0.557
	No Party	-0.044	0.496	-0.170	0.008	-0.052	0.296	-0.057	0.301	-0.046	0.411
	Several	0.032	0.619	-0.137	0.037	-0.105	0.022	-0.044	0.436	-0.089	0.096
	DNK/NR	-0.060	0.621	-0.070	0.573	0.012	0.917	-0.054	0.635	n.a.	n.a.
Primary news source (SRG SSR)	TX Group	0.065	0.184	0.085	0.079	-0.013	0.747	0.050	0.300	0.012	0.790
	CH Media	0.025	0.673	0.115	0.039	0.027	0.606	-0.024	0.633	0.049	0.395
	NZZ Group	0.025	0.622	0.069	0.178	-0.009	0.820	0.030	0.532	-0.007	0.875
	Weltwoche	-0.385	0.001	n.a.		-0.180	0.000	-0.210	0.001	-0.155	0.032
	Republik	0.294	0.005	0.274	0.005	0.062	0.585	0.006	0.952	0.132	0.288
	Other	0.005	0.909	-0.026	0.595	-0.020	0.640	-0.003	0.951	0.065	0.182
Second news source (SRG SSR)	TX Group	-0.072	0.131	-0.010	0.842	-0.085	0.069	-0.033	0.471	-0.008	0.860
	CH Media	-0.063	0.194	-0.014	0.786	-0.114	0.016	-0.061	0.193	-0.002	0.962
	NZZ Group	-0.144	0.007	-0.084	0.140	-0.141	0.003	-0.040	0.422	-0.006	0.904
	Nau	-0.027	0.794	0.082	0.417	-0.098	0.353	0.003	0.980	0.246	0.036
	Somedia	-0.110	0.317	0.014	0.900	-0.136	0.146	-0.098	0.317	0.054	0.620
	Weltwoche	-0.354	0.001	-0.248	0.019	-0.177	0.020	-0.145	0.076	-0.142	0.050
	Republik	0.064	0.331	0.073	0.293	-0.036	0.595	0.025	0.710	0.103	0.131
	WOZ	-0.156	0.128	0.000	0.997	0.082	0.451	0.128	0.210	0.180	0.084
	Other	-0.101	0.030	-0.021	0.667	-0.071	0.130	-0.033	0.468	-0.004	0.920
	DNK/NR	-0.138	0.116	0.006	0.941	-0.192	0.007	-0.196	0.006	-0.006	0.945
N		1566		1538		1551		1566		1548	
Likelihood-ratio		288.5		186.2		147.5		185.9		138.0	
Pseudo-R ²		0.136		0.090		0.090		0.101		0.077	

Notes: Estimates are discrete effects (relative to reference) from of logit regressions of binary outcomes. DNK/NR: Don't know/no response; n.a.: variable not estimable.

Table S2.2. Statements U6 to U10.

Variable (reference)	Level	U1		U2		U3		U4		U5	
		dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z
Wording	Wording A	0.015	0.430	-0.009	0.644	0.013	0.393	0.001	0.947	-0.010	0.365
Age (<40)	Age 40-64	0.086	0.000	0.114	0.000	0.050	0.005	0.021	0.211	0.040	0.005
	Age 65+	0.086	0.001	0.184	0.000	0.060	0.008	0.023	0.274	-0.005	0.710
Gender	Female	-0.064	0.001	-0.121	0.000	-0.048	0.003	-0.051	0.001	-0.046	0.000
Education (low)	Edu medium	-0.051	0.252	-0.024	0.577	-0.032	0.416	0.038	0.189	0.017	0.549
	Edu high	-0.042	0.321	-0.008	0.841	-0.037	0.314	0.038	0.131	-0.001	0.955
Income (<5000)	5000-9'999	0.015	0.498	0.015	0.488	0.012	0.485	0.009	0.574	0.016	0.233
	10k-14'999	0.021	0.603	-0.014	0.706	0.028	0.401	0.043	0.251	-0.014	0.468
	15'000+	0.004	0.946	-0.006	0.916	0.036	0.531	-0.023	0.589	n.a.	n.a.
	DNK/NR	-0.033	0.241	0.032	0.317	0.040	0.138	0.003	0.882	0.004	0.842
Residence (rural)	Urban	0.061	0.024	0.000	0.998	0.016	0.537	0.004	0.858	0.016	0.286
	Intermediate	0.025	0.421	0.012	0.745	-0.017	0.546	0.001	0.985	0.037	0.063
	DNK/NR	0.160	0.045	0.074	0.336	0.101	0.157	0.063	0.368	0.149	0.054
News time (<30 min.)	30-59 min.	0.047	0.210	0.020	0.588	-0.027	0.441	0.011	0.712	0.026	0.108
	60-119 min.	0.084	0.012	0.087	0.009	0.007	0.828	0.011	0.683	0.042	0.002
	20+ min.	0.074	0.033	0.117	0.001	0.016	0.642	0.027	0.337	0.055	0.000
	NDK/NR	0.111	0.198	-0.052	0.324	-0.039	0.481	0.045	0.506	0.070	0.205
Trust gov. (high)	medium	-0.007	0.765	-0.079	0.000	-0.041	0.032	-0.029	0.124	-0.013	0.337
	low	0.024	0.347	-0.033	0.182	-0.029	0.163	-0.031	0.092	0.016	0.314
Party id. (Center)	People' s P.	0.115	0.009	-0.066	0.085	0.000	0.994	0.012	0.747	0.030	0.298
	Social Dem.	0.008	0.796	0.019	0.584	-0.031	0.286	0.008	0.788	-0.020	0.285
	Liberals	0.089	0.021	-0.007	0.859	-0.002	0.963	-0.043	0.119	-0.005	0.830
	Greens	0.058	0.173	0.018	0.684	-0.066	0.041	-0.032	0.313	0.004	0.877
	EVP	0.190	0.073	0.078	0.422	0.082	0.372	-0.047	0.388	0.050	0.462
	Green Lib.	0.024	0.491	0.056	0.146	0.013	0.690	-0.003	0.934	0.001	0.962
	Alt. Left	0.223	0.083	-0.110	0.116	0.070	0.513	0.136	0.274	0.111	0.292
	Other	0.110	0.237	-0.043	0.617	0.040	0.647	-0.040	0.503	0.033	0.675
	No Party	0.046	0.333	-0.013	0.780	-0.024	0.563	-0.001	0.981	0.000	0.993
	Several	0.001	0.973	-0.038	0.408	-0.061	0.098	-0.055	0.094	-0.016	0.543
	DNK/NR	-0.057	0.431	0.007	0.947	0.003	0.976	-0.036	0.573	0.005	0.929
Primary news source (SRG SSR)	TX Group	-0.020	0.598	-0.040	0.254	-0.059	0.021	-0.013	0.658	0.004	0.860
	CH Media	0.004	0.936	0.017	0.724	-0.018	0.626	-0.031	0.292	-0.027	0.185
	NZZ Group	-0.002	0.956	0.005	0.909	0.004	0.906	-0.030	0.239	-0.002	0.924
	Weltwoche	-0.087	0.061	n.a.	n.a.	-0.064	0.134	-0.064	0.049	n.a.	n.a.
	Republik	0.030	0.776	0.106	0.351	-0.041	0.592	0.093	0.385	n.a.	n.a.
	Other	0.013	0.730	0.001	0.971	-0.020	0.537	0.005	0.868	-0.036	0.020
Second news source (SRG SSR)	TX Group	0.030	0.430	-0.031	0.429	-0.041	0.241	0.005	0.879	0.005	0.851
	CH Media	-0.002	0.948	-0.017	0.679	-0.032	0.374	-0.043	0.151	-0.015	0.547
	NZZ Group	0.035	0.409	-0.047	0.263	-0.027	0.491	-0.018	0.587	-0.007	0.806
	Nau	-0.117	0.013	0.063	0.550	0.104	0.287	0.067	0.450	0.024	0.676
	Somedia	0.214	0.054	0.023	0.813	-0.043	0.528	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Weltwoche	0.010	0.876	-0.038	0.609	-0.075	0.127	0.089	0.288	n.a.	n.a.
	Republik	0.068	0.254	0.140	0.031	0.032	0.583	0.006	0.901	0.001	0.974
	WOZ	0.037	0.659	0.002	0.981	0.109	0.263	-0.031	0.555	-0.019	0.675
	Other	0.008	0.813	-0.002	0.967	-0.022	0.538	0.004	0.895	-0.017	0.467
	DNK/NR	-0.080	0.176	-0.095	0.175	-0.060	0.308	n.a.	n.a.	0.001	0.976
N		1566		1538		1551		1566		1548	
Likelihood-ratio		288.5		186.2		147.5		185.9		138.0	
Pseudo-R ²		0.136		0.090		0.090		0.101		0.077	

Notes: Estimates are discrete effects (relative to reference) from of logit regressions of binary outcomes. DNK/NR: Don't know/no response; n.a.: variable not estimable.

Table S2.3. Statements V1 to V6.

Variable (reference)	Level	U1		U2		U3		U4		U5	
		dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z
Wording	Wording A	-0.041	0.058	-0.008	0.691	-0.014	0.563	-0.038	0.056	0.000	0.982
Age (<40)	Age 40-64	-0.017	0.520	-0.065	0.010	-0.007	0.813	0.037	0.122	0.053	0.023
	Age 65+	-0.057	0.071	-0.002	0.950	0.011	0.757	0.024	0.402	0.081	0.004
Gender	Female	0.013	0.577	0.012	0.570	-0.063	0.011	-0.048	0.019	-0.038	0.056
Education (low)	Edu medium	0.025	0.606	-0.027	0.594	-0.022	0.683	0.033	0.457	0.040	0.378
	Edu high	0.075	0.093	0.006	0.889	0.054	0.289	0.017	0.674	-0.019	0.649
Income (<5000)	5000-9'999	0.002	0.931	0.056	0.021	0.003	0.917	0.027	0.231	0.002	0.944
	10k-14'999	-0.125	0.004	-0.001	0.979	-0.032	0.543	0.020	0.636	0.012	0.773
	15'000+	0.040	0.642	0.201	0.022	0.060	0.511	0.069	0.375	0.048	0.517
	DNK/NR	-0.069	0.043	-0.012	0.708	-0.083	0.027	0.033	0.317	0.020	0.523
Residence (rural)	Urban	-0.024	0.541	0.054	0.121	-0.081	0.053	-0.022	0.506	-0.012	0.715
	Intermediate	-0.046	0.288	0.019	0.633	-0.114	0.015	-0.033	0.390	0.004	0.909
	DNK/NR	-0.020	0.807	0.155	0.068	0.053	0.557	0.041	0.629	-0.001	0.989
News time (<30 min.)	30-59 min.	0.073	0.090	0.075	0.069	0.018	0.724	0.067	0.074	0.043	0.255
	60-119 min.	0.050	0.186	0.057	0.114	0.064	0.154	0.084	0.009	0.068	0.037
	20+ min.	0.059	0.140	0.087	0.023	0.079	0.096	0.115	0.001	0.156	0.000
	NDK/NR	0.118	0.188	0.054	0.524	0.061	0.528	0.045	0.520	-0.059	0.224
Trust gov. (high)	medium	-0.060	0.028	-0.095	0.000	-0.013	0.674	-0.021	0.398	0.017	0.497
	low	-0.031	0.290	-0.088	0.001	-0.008	0.797	0.040	0.140	0.030	0.253
Party id. (Center)	People' s P.	-0.128	0.002	-0.048	0.281	0.006	0.920	-0.010	0.832	-0.082	0.044
	Social Dem.	0.077	0.053	0.088	0.018	-0.101	0.025	-0.052	0.162	-0.045	0.212
	Liberals	0.023	0.619	0.101	0.023	-0.060	0.241	0.008	0.848	0.020	0.636
	Greens	0.146	0.004	0.062	0.183	-0.057	0.303	-0.055	0.225	0.005	0.920
	EVP	0.000	0.998	0.124	0.256	0.065	0.584	0.039	0.709	0.065	0.535
	Green Lib.	0.054	0.222	0.072	0.086	-0.004	0.939	-0.055	0.176	0.022	0.595
	Alt. Left	0.082	0.499	0.031	0.787	-0.173	0.138	-0.083	0.390	-0.138	0.053
	Other	-0.015	0.868	-0.092	0.209	0.143	0.172	0.034	0.720	0.060	0.545
	No Party	0.001	0.991	-0.047	0.353	-0.054	0.402	-0.032	0.534	-0.030	0.548
	Several	-0.004	0.948	-0.080	0.082	-0.189	0.002	-0.075	0.135	-0.076	0.109
	DNK/NR	-0.168	0.011	-0.094	0.206	-0.194	0.069	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Primary news source (SRG SSR)	TX Group	-0.025	0.605	-0.047	0.279	0.007	0.891	-0.009	0.819	-0.013	0.740
	CH Media	-0.002	0.979	0.011	0.838	0.004	0.945	-0.057	0.177	0.029	0.550
	NZZ Group	-0.175	0.000	-0.100	0.008	0.040	0.443	0.008	0.843	0.082	0.077
	Weltwoche	n.a.	n.a.	-0.166	0.041	-0.233	0.000	-0.110	0.016	n.a.	n.a.
	Republik	0.160	0.206	-0.029	0.778	0.031	0.804	-0.108	0.188	-0.054	0.523
	Other	-0.087	0.038	-0.006	0.890	0.029	0.554	0.047	0.281	-0.031	0.402
Second news source (SRG SSR)	TX Group	-0.092	0.077	-0.063	0.198	-0.001	0.986	-0.034	0.397	-0.029	0.492
	CH Media	-0.052	0.331	-0.060	0.230	-0.101	0.044	-0.029	0.481	-0.061	0.145
	NZZ Group	-0.131	0.014	-0.122	0.014	-0.055	0.320	-0.011	0.801	-0.041	0.365
	Nau	0.056	0.653	-0.054	0.654	-0.001	0.990	0.055	0.589	-0.040	0.679
	Somedia	0.055	0.639	-0.074	0.476	-0.047	0.693	-0.096	0.212	-0.059	0.507
	Weltwoche	-0.036	0.779	-0.075	0.499	0.007	0.947	-0.076	0.224	-0.082	0.246
	Republik	-0.090	0.160	-0.085	0.178	0.069	0.342	0.014	0.829	0.011	0.868
	WOZ	-0.010	0.914	-0.184	0.016	0.058	0.591	-0.107	0.127	0.023	0.813
	Other	-0.042	0.425	-0.068	0.156	0.025	0.612	0.046	0.270	-0.022	0.602
	DNK/NR	0.005	0.958	-0.091	0.265	-0.080	0.360	0.049	0.553	-0.075	0.308
N		1566	1538		1566		1566		1548		1520
Likelihood-ratio		288.5	136.6		131.1		85.5		68.4		111.1
Pseudo-R ²		0.136	0.077		0.077		0.042		0.046		0.076

Notes: Estimates are discrete effects (relative to reference) from of logit regressions of binary outcomes. DNK/NR: Don't know/no response; n.a.: variable not estimable.

Table S2.4. Statements V6 to V10.

Variable (reference)	Level	U1		U2		U3		U4		U5	
		dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z	dy/dx	P>z
Wording	Wording A	-0.018	0.342	-0.038	0.056	0.006	0.535	0.001	0.969	-0.003	0.852
Age (<40)	Age 40-64	-0.024	0.312	0.052	0.029	0.008	0.472	0.049	0.015	0.007	0.679
	Age 65+	-0.005	0.870	0.016	0.555	0.019	0.185	0.032	0.174	0.025	0.262
Gender	Female	-0.003	0.889	-0.072	0.000	0.006	0.535	-0.080	0.000	-0.043	0.005
Education (low)	Edu medium	0.057	0.121	0.028	0.527	-0.046	0.112	-0.016	0.710	0.051	0.083
	Edu high	0.076	0.021	0.065	0.101	-0.067	0.016	-0.080	0.052	0.045	0.063
Income (<5000)	5000-9'999	0.013	0.537	0.029	0.223	-0.008	0.413	0.065	0.001	0.022	0.197
	10k-14'999	0.037	0.430	0.003	0.949	0.005	0.815	0.028	0.390	-0.018	0.491
	15'000+	0.029	0.703	-0.058	0.302	n.a.	n.a.	0.089	0.172	0.054	0.342
	DNK/NR	0.045	0.167	-0.054	0.067	0.019	0.276	0.021	0.415	0.007	0.780
Residence (rural)	Urban	-0.022	0.508	0.040	0.208	-0.031	0.097	0.017	0.504	0.015	0.536
	Intermediate	0.049	0.215	-0.004	0.902	-0.023	0.265	0.055	0.068	0.009	0.733
	DNK/NR	0.043	0.570	0.144	0.095	-0.038	0.173	-0.064	0.214	0.084	0.253
News time (<30 min.)	30-59 min.	0.031	0.303	-0.010	0.814	0.008	0.675	0.014	0.711	-0.030	0.342
	60-119 min.	0.089	0.001	0.047	0.216	0.006	0.749	0.019	0.552	0.000	0.989
	20+ min.	0.139	0.000	0.029	0.472	0.011	0.555	0.070	0.044	0.013	0.675
	NDK/NR	0.043	0.467	-0.010	0.900	0.007	0.850	-0.002	0.971	0.052	0.501
Trust gov. (high)	medium	0.026	0.278	-0.029	0.266	-0.005	0.671	0.013	0.561	-0.070	0.000
	low	0.026	0.295	-0.063	0.012	0.017	0.208	0.041	0.075	-0.075	0.000
Party id. (Center)	People' s P.	-0.044	0.257	-0.074	0.105	0.010	0.672	0.041	0.311	0.023	0.488
	Social Dem.	0.066	0.060	-0.040	0.303	-0.024	0.131	-0.109	0.000	0.020	0.422
	Liberals	-0.031	0.393	-0.025	0.567	0.016	0.478	0.040	0.283	0.000	0.993
	Greens	0.019	0.645	-0.057	0.220	-0.032	0.062	-0.056	0.166	0.015	0.634
	EVP	0.080	0.432	0.005	0.960	0.023	0.698	0.046	0.623	0.030	0.658
	Green Lib.	0.012	0.739	-0.062	0.127	-0.003	0.874	-0.052	0.120	0.036	0.189
	Alt. Left	0.058	0.579	-0.097	0.344	0.059	0.393	n.a.	n.a.	0.111	0.345
	Other	0.009	0.915	-0.128	0.116	-0.009	0.798	0.125	0.183	n.a.	n.a.
	No Party	0.058	0.264	-0.008	0.893	-0.006	0.790	-0.038	0.362	0.001	0.979
	Several	-0.002	0.968	-0.130	0.007	0.006	0.815	-0.060	0.154	0.085	0.068
	DNK/NR	0.012	0.895	-0.182	0.008	n.a.	n.a.	-0.086	0.254	n.a.	n.a.
Primary news source (SRG SSR)	TX Group	-0.102	0.002	0.113	0.019	-0.017	0.341	0.013	0.707	0.015	0.635
	CH Media	-0.120	0.001	-0.008	0.873	-0.025	0.116	-0.058	0.063	-0.017	0.576
	NZZ Group	-0.104	0.003	0.047	0.288	-0.020	0.261	0.066	0.077	0.035	0.316
	Weltwoche	n.a.	n.a.	-0.036	0.662	-0.013	0.632	-0.087	0.005	n.a.	n.a.
	Republik	0.073	0.502	-0.116	0.095	0.136	0.235	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Other	-0.045	0.237	-0.005	0.897	-0.035	0.004	-0.025	0.416	0.012	0.701
Second news source (SRG SSR)	TX Group	-0.130	0.014	0.051	0.195	-0.022	0.382	-0.007	0.830	-0.033	0.252
	CH Media	-0.123	0.023	0.019	0.627	-0.021	0.414	-0.034	0.318	0.017	0.606
	NZZ Group	-0.143	0.009	0.014	0.738	-0.018	0.511	-0.023	0.533	-0.008	0.802
	Nau	-0.067	0.547	0.110	0.305	0.157	0.046	0.057	0.491	0.259	0.029
	Somedia	-0.182	0.023	-0.063	0.449	n.a.	n.a.	-0.052	0.459	-0.025	0.729
	Weltwoche	-0.166	0.048	-0.012	0.878	-0.026	0.418	-0.007	0.893	0.096	0.291
	Republik	-0.010	0.895	0.052	0.377	-0.029	0.343	-0.058	0.282	0.007	0.886
	WOZ	-0.115	0.148	0.087	0.362	0.020	0.760	n.a.	n.a.	-0.050	0.329
	Other	-0.103	0.052	-0.013	0.721	-0.019	0.444	0.000	0.995	-0.026	0.376
	DNK/NR	-0.163	0.024	-0.019	0.795	0.034	0.505	-0.027	0.664	-0.029	0.580
N		1566	1538		1566		1498		1513		1480
Likelihood-ratio		288.5	88.2		96.4		81.0		180.7		67.9
Pseudo-R ²		0.136	0.063		0.062		0.179		0.151		0.077

Notes: Estimates are discrete effects (relative to reference) from of logit regressions of binary outcomes. DNK/NR: Don't know/no response; n.a.: variable not estimable.

Supplement S3: Questionnaire

Studie: Mediennarrative
FS Economic Research
255325
16.06.25
10 Min
Schweizer Einwohner:innen ab 18 Jahren, die Deutsch sprechen
Online-Befragung
Polittrends
Mitte - Ende Juni
Deutsch
Meinungen zum politischen Geschehen
gfs.bern Umfrage
Meinungen zum politischen Geschehen
Einleitung
Herzlich willkommen zur Online-Befragung. Bevor es los geht, möchten wir Sie nach Ihrem Alter und Geschlecht fragen. Für Ihre Teilnahme danken wir Ihnen im Voraus bestens.
Geschlecht
Bitte geben Sie Ihr Geschlecht an.
Frau
Mann
Alter
Bitte geben Sie Ihr Alter an.
(offene Antwort)
Treatment
<i>Filter: innerhalb der Alter x Geschlecht-Quote (kreuzquotiert) zufällig und gleichmässig Display A resp. Display B anzeigen</i>
Im Rahmen eines Forschungsprojekts interessieren wir uns für Ihre Wahrnehmung von aktuellen Themen und Ereignissen .
Bitte antworten Sie spontan. Wir interessieren uns für Ihre Wahrnehmung.
Ihre Antworten werden von uns und FS Economic Research für Meinungsforschungszwecke und nur in aggregierter Form ausgewertet. FS Economic Research erhält weder Ihren Namen noch Ihre Kontaktangaben von uns; diese Informationen löschen wir sofort nach der Befragung.
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme.
Im Rahmen eines Forschungsprojekts interessieren wir uns für Ihre Wahrnehmung von weit verbreiteten Ansichten zu aktuellen Themen und Ereignissen .
Bitte antworten Sie spontan. Wir interessieren uns für Ihre Wahrnehmung.
Ihre Antworten werden von uns und FS Economic Research für Meinungsforschungszwecke und nur in aggregierter Form ausgewertet. FS Economic Research erhält weder Ihren Namen noch Ihre Kontaktangaben von uns; diese Informationen löschen wir sofort nach der Befragung.
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme.
Aussageliste Ukraine
In einer ersten Reihe von Fragen geht es um Themen und Ereignisse im Zusammenhang mit dem Krieg in der Ukraine. Bitte geben Sie an, inwieweit Sie folgenden Aussagen zustimmen.

Der Überfall Russlands auf die Ukraine ist ein unprovoked Angriffskrieg.
Dass die USA und Grossbritannien im Frühling 2022 einem Friedensvertrag zwischen der Ukraine und Russland im Weg standen, ist eine Verschwörungstheorie.
Am Anfang des Ukraine-Krieges hat ein ukrainischer Kampfpilot (der "Ghost of Kiev") in wenigen Tagen zahlreiche russische Flugzeuge abgeschossen.
Die Osterweiterung der NATO ist für Russland keine ernsthafte Bedrohung.
Russland unter Putin ist eine Gefahr für ganz Europa.
Beim Terroranschlag auf die Nord Stream Pipeline richtet sich der Hauptverdacht der deutschen Regierung auf einen per Haftbefehl gesuchten Ukrainer.
Die aktuelle Krise der deutschen Wirtschaft hat wenig mit den Sanktionen gegen Russland und aus diesem Grund hohen Energiepreisen zu tun.
stimme voll und ganz zu
stimme eher zu
teils-teils
stimme eher nicht zu
stimme überhaupt nicht zu
weiss nicht / keine Antwort
Aussageliste Letzte Jahre
In den nächsten Fragen geht es um weitere Themen und Ereignisse der letzten Jahre. Bitte geben Sie wiederum an, inwieweit Sie folgenden Aussagen zustimmen.
Die Covid-19-Impfstoffe (Corona-Impfstoffe) von Moderna und Pfizer verhinderten die Übertragung des Virus.
Iran kann nur noch mit militärischen Mitteln davon abgehalten werden, Atomwaffen zu entwickeln.
China betreibt ein Sozialpunktesystem, das auf einer weitgehenden Überwachung der Bevölkerung beruht und bei tiefer Punktzahl zu Einschränkungen im Alltag führen kann.
Der Ursprung der Covid-19-Pandemie (Corona) ist wahrscheinlich eine Übertragung des Virus von einem Tier auf einen Menschen.
Russland und China haben im Jahr 2024 absichtlich Unterseekabel zerstört.
Vermutungen, der Kindersex-Händler Jeffrey Epstein habe mit amerikanischen und israelischen Geheimdiensten zusammengearbeitet, sind abwegige Verschwörungstheorien.
Chinas Statistiker publizieren seit Jahren geschönte Zahlen zum Wirtschaftswachstum.
Bitte klicken Sie hier auf "stimme voll und ganz zu", damit wir wissen, dass Sie die Aussagen aufmerksam lesen. Besten Dank.
stimme voll und ganz zu
stimme eher zu
teils-teils
stimme eher nicht zu
stimme überhaupt nicht zu
weiss nicht / keine Antwort
Aussageliste viele Jahre früher
In den letzten Fragen dieser Art geht es um Themen und Ereignisse, die weiter zurück liegen. Bitte geben Sie auch hier an, inwieweit Sie folgenden Aussagen zustimmen.
Die USA haben Russland nie versprochen, dass die NATO nicht nach Osten erweitert wird.
Der Minsk II-Vertrag mit Russland (2016) war eine ernsthafte Friedensbemühung der Ukraine, Frankreichs und Deutschlands, die von Russland unterlaufen wurde.
Die amerikanischen Waffeninspektoren fanden im Irak unter Saddam Hussein Belege für irakische Massenvernichtungswaffen.
Die Absetzung der russlandfreundlichen ukrainischen Regierung im Jahr 2014 (Euromaidan-Proteste) war eine Revolution, die aus dem Volk kam.
Trump hat in seiner Wahlkampagne 2016 mit russischen Propagandisten zusammengearbeitet.
Zwischen Lee Harvey Oswald – dem Mörder des US-Präsidenten John F. Kennedy (1963) – und dem amerikanischen Geheimdienst CIA gab es keine Kontakte.
stimme voll und ganz zu
stimme eher zu
teils-teils
stimme eher nicht zu
stimme überhaupt nicht zu
weiss nicht / keine Antwort
Politisches Interesse

Wie interessiert sind Sie im Allgemeinen an der Politik?
sehr interessiert
eher interessiert
eher nicht interessiert
überhaupt nicht interessiert
weiss nicht / keine Angabe
Werthaltungen
Wir möchten Ihnen jetzt einige Fragen zu verschiedenen Aspekten der schweizerischen Gesellschaft stellen. Bitte geben Sie an, was Sie sich für die Schweiz wünschen. Wenn Sie mit Aussage A übereinstimmen, wählen Sie die Zahl 1 oder eine Zahl nahe bei 1. Wenn Sie mit Aussage B übereinstimmen, wählen Sie die Zahl 6 oder eine Zahl nahe bei 6. Mit den Werten dazwischen können Sie Ihre Meinung abstufen.
Werthaltung Abschottung
A) eine Schweiz, die auf internationale Zusammenarbeit und globalen Austausch setzt, oder B) eine Schweiz, die primär auf nationale Eigenständigkeit baut.
1 – internationale Zusammenarbeit
2
3
4
5
6 – nationale Eigenständigkeit
weiss nicht / keine Angabe
Werthaltung Zuwanderung
A) eine Schweiz, die die Zuwanderung fördert, oder B) eine Schweiz, die die Zuwanderung erschwert.
1 - Zuwanderung fördern
2
3
4
5
6 – Zuwanderung erschweren
weiss nicht / keine Angabe
Informationsverhalten
Wie regelmässig informieren Sie sich im Alltag über das aktuelle Geschehen in Politik und Gesellschaft?
mehrmals täglich
täglich
mehrmals pro Woche
einmal pro Woche
seltener als einmal pro Woche
gar nie
weiss nicht/keine Antwort
Mediennutzung
Wenn Sie an ihren Nachrichtenkonsum denken (z.B. Online-Zeitung, Print-Zeitung, Radio, Fernsehen, soziale Medien), wie lange lesen, hören oder schauen Sie Nachrichten pro Tag?
Stunden: _____ (max. 24h)
Minuten: _____ (max. 60 Min)
weiss nicht / keine Angabe
Relative Mediennutzung
Wenn Sie nun an Ihren Freundeskreis denken, sind Sie jemand, der oder die mehr als Ihre Kolleg:innen Nachrichten konsumiert oder weniger?
konsumiere mehr Nachrichten als andere im Freundeskreis
konsumiere weniger Nachrichten als andere im Freundeskreis
weiss nicht / keine Angabe

Mediennutzung Freunde
Wie oft sprechen Sie mit Freundinnen, Freunde und der Familie über das, was Sie in den Nachrichten gelesen, gehört oder geschaut haben?
sehr oft
oft
manchmal
selten
so gut wie nie
weiss nicht / keine Angabe
Favorisiertes Medium
Welchen Nachrichtenquelle nutzen Sie am meisten?
SRG (Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen)
TX Group (Tamedia-Zeitungen, 20 Minuten)
CH Media (Regionalmedien AZ, Watson)
NZZ-Gruppe (NZZ, NZZ am Sonntag)
Nau
Somedia (Regionalmedien Südostschweiz)
Weltwoche
Republik
Genossenschaft Infolink (WOZ)
Andere
weiss nicht/keine Angabe
Welchen Nachrichtenquelle nutzen Sie am zweitmeisten?
SRG (Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen)
TX Group (Tamedia-Zeitungen, 20 Minuten)
CH Media (Regionalmedien AZ, Watson)
NZZ-Gruppe (NZZ, NZZ am Sonntag)
Nau
Somedia (Regionalmedien Südostschweiz)
Weltwoche
Republik
Genossenschaft Infolink (WOZ)
Andere
weiss nicht/keine Angabe
Wichtige Medien
Wenn Sie sich überlegen, wie Sie zu einem Nachrichtenartikel kommen, ist dies häufiger, weil Sie direkt auf ein Medium (z.B. NZZ, Tages-Anzeiger, Blick, SRF News) zugreifen oder geschieht dies via Social Media (z.B. Facebook, X, Instagram, WhatsApp)?
häufiger über direkten Zugriff
häufiger über indirekten Zugriff (z.B. via soziale Medien)
weiss nicht / keine Antwort
Aussagen zu Medien
Wir haben einige Aussagen zu Medien zusammengetragen, die man immer wieder hört. Bitte geben Sie an, inwiefern Sie diesen Aussagen zustimmen.
Ich habe Vertrauen in die traditionellen Medien.
Die Medien sollten sich vor allem der Wahrheit verpflichtet fühlen.
Die Medien sollten in Krisen und Konflikten unvoreingenommen berichten.
Die Medien sollten in Krisen die Regierung unterstützen.
Die Medien sollten in internationalen Konflikten die Interessen des eigenen Landes vertreten.
stimme voll und ganz zu
stimme eher zu
teils-teils
stimme eher nicht zu
stimme überhaupt nicht zu

weiss nicht / keine Angabe
Schluss-Display
Zum Schluss stellen wir Ihnen noch einige Fragen zu Ihrer Person.
Verhältnis zur Regierung
Es gibt zwei Ansichten, die man recht oft über unsere Regierung hören kann. Welcher stimmen Sie am ehesten zu?
A) Ich kann mich meistens auf die Regierung im Bundeshaus verlassen. Sie handelt nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen, zum Wohle aller.
B) Im Bundeshaus wird immer mehr gegen und immer weniger für das Volk entschieden. Die Regierung kennt unsere Sorgen und Wünsche nicht mehr.
A) Regierung verlassen
B) Regierung gegen Volk
unentschieden
weiss nicht / keine Angabe
Links-Rechts-Selbsteinstufung
«Links», «Zentrum» und «rechts» sind drei Begriffe, die häufig gebraucht werden, um politische Ansichten zu charakterisieren. Geben Sie bitte an, wo Sie selber stehen auf einer Skala, wo 0 ganz links, 5 das politische Zentrum und 10 ganz rechts bedeutet
0 - ganz links
5 - Zentrum
10 - ganz rechts
weiss nicht/keine Antwort
Partei-Identifikation
Welche Partei entspricht Ihren Ansichten am meisten?
SVP Schweizerische Volkspartei
SP Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz
FDP FDP.Die Liberalen
Die Mitte
GRÜNE Schweiz
EVP Evangelische Volkspartei
Mitte Links - CSP Schweiz
GLP Grünliberale Partei
Alternative Linke/Alternative Liste/Partei der Arbeit
EDU Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union
Piratenpartei
eindeutig andere Partei
keine Partei
mehrere Parteien gleich
weiss nicht/keine Antwort
Stimmberechtigung
Sind Sie in eidgenössischen Fragen stimmberechtigt?
Ja
Nein
Staatsbürgerschaft
Welche Staatsbürgerschaft haben Sie?

Schweiz
Andere Staatsbürgerschaft_Auswahl (DROPDOWN; print offen)
weiss nicht/keine Antwort
Ausbildung
Was ist Ihre höchste abgeschlossene Ausbildung?
keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung/Primarschule
obligatorische Schule
Übergangsausbildungen (z.B. Vorlehre, 10. Schuljahr, Haushaltslehre)
Allgemeinbildung ohne Maturität (z.B. Fachmittelschule FMS, Diplommittelschule DMS, Verkehrsschule)
berufliche Grundbildung oder Berufslehre (Anlehre, Berufsattest, Vollzeitberufsschule, Handelsmittelschule, Lehrwerkstätte)
Maturität oder Lehrkräfteseminar (Gymnasium, Berufsmaturität, Fachmaturität)
nach-sekundäre nicht-tertiäre Stufe (Zusatz- oder Zweitausbildung)
höhere Berufsbildung mit eidg. Fachausweis, Meisterdiplom (Technikerschule, HTL, HWV, HFG, HFS)
Fachhochschule, Universität, ETH (auch Pädagogische Hochschule, Lizentiat, Bachelor, Master, Nachdiplomstudium)
Doktorat, Habilitation
andere
weiss nicht/keine Antwort
Einkommen
Wie hoch ist ungefähr das Netto -Monatseinkommen Ihres Haushalts ?
Falls in Ihrem Haushalt mehrere Personen etwas für den Unterhalt beisteuern, zählen Sie bitte alle Einkommen zusammen. Zählen Sie nicht nur die Löhne, sondern auch allfällige andere Einkommen dazu.
Dropdown 0 - 25'000 + CHF in 1000er Schritten
weiss nicht / keine Angabe
Anzahl Personen im Haushalt
Wie viele Personen in Ihrem Haushalt, <i>inklusive Ihnen</i>, sind 14-jährig oder älter? Und wie viele Personen in Ihrem Haushalt sind jünger als 14-jährig?
14-jährig und älter: _____
unter 14-jährig: _____
Wohnort PLZ
Bitte geben Sie für die Statistik die Postleitzahl Ihres Wohnortes und Ihren Wohnort an.
Dropdown mit PLZ und Ort
weiss nicht / keine Angabe
Abschluss
Das wäre es. Wir danken Ihnen und wünschen Ihnen einen schönen Tag!